• The killing of 37 civilians in a suspected militant attack in Darey-Dey in Niger’s Tillaberi region on August 16 comes amid a spate of high-casualty attacks against civilians in Niger. While jihadist groups traditionally refrain from claiming attacks targeting civilians, it remains possible that jihadists perceived locals of collaborating with security forces and conducted this attack to intimidate locals from helping the government.
• Regardless, these attacks highlight a change in the dynamic of the Sahelian conflict, with militant groups more willing to target civilians. While the security forces are likely to conduct counter-militant operations in response, given precedent, it is likely to have a limited impact on militant attacks in the area.
• Meanwhile, the Ghanaian National Peace Council (NPC) claimed that jihadists were planning to attack West African coastal cities during a joint dialogue initiative with the UN to counter militancy in northern Ghana on August 11. While jihadist groups have professed their desire to expand their territory, they rarely attack large cities and capitals within Sahelian countries, and it is unlikely they have the ability or inclination to do so. 
• However, this claim demonstrates the NPC’s heightened threat perception of militancy spilling over from Burkina Faso into Ghana and can explain its ongoing dialogue initiative, likely to prevent radicalization. Such initiatives, along with traditional counter-militant operations along Ghana’s border with Burkina Faso are likely to persist.

Across the region, the following notable incidents have been reported:

Mali

Burkina Faso

Niger

• Reports from August 11 indicate that the Ghanaian National Peace Council (NPC) claimed that militants are seeking to target economic centers on coastal West African cities, such as Accra, Nigeria’s Lagos, and Benin’s capital Cotonou. The statement was reportedly made during a joint workshop with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) on countering potential militant spillover in Ghana’s Upper East Region through dialogue.

High-casualty militant attacks on civilians in Niger’s Darey-Dey marks change in militant tactics further deteriorating security landscape 

1. The attack in Niger’s Darey-Dey comes amid a spate of high-casualty militant attacks in the Tillaberi region. At least 70 civilians were killed in multiple attacks in Banibangou in late July and 66 villagers were killed in a raid in Darey-Dey on March 16.  In this context, the high death toll underscores entrenched militancy in the tri-border region. Furthermore, the militants’ ability to attack villages and escape unharmed also demonstrates the security forces’ limited defensive capabilities near the porous border region. The targeting of civilians is notable given that jihadist groups have generally claimed to avoid targeting non-government Muslim civilians. In this context, it remains plausible that militants perceived civilians are cooperating with the government forces against them, with these attacks likely intended to intimidate civilians from further such cooperation. 
2. That said, several ethnic militias operate in the region and have loose ties to jihadist groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and militant ideology. Thus, it remains possible that these militias are conducting these attacks independently from jihadist groups’ central command, with their actions motivated by personal and communal grievances and not jihadist ideology or strategy, explaining the large-scale civilian casualties. Regardless of the perpetrator’s identity, the targeting of civilians marks a change in the dynamic of the Sahelian conflict, with a strong risk posed to civilians by militant attacks. 
3. FORECAST: The Nigerian Armed Forces (FAN) are likely to carry out counter-militant operations in Darey-Dey in response to this latest attack. However, given precedent, these operations are likely to have a limited impact on reducing militancy, with similar attacks likely to persist leading to additional Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) across Niger over the coming months. The security forces’ inability to prevent such attacks is likely to reduce trust between the civilians and the authorities. This may lead to the creation of civilian self-defense militias to protect against militant attacks, with such an outcome likely to further deteriorate the security landscape over the coming months. 

NPC’s claim of militant threat to coastal West African cities highlights heightened threat perception of jihadist spillover 

1. Meanwhile, the Ghanaian NPC’s claim of an existing militant threat to West African nations’ most prominent cities, including Accra, Lagos, and Cotonou, is highly notable and comes after JNIM released a video featuring a Ghanaian national calling upon local Ghanaian Fulanis to join the jihad on June 26. However, militants have thus far refrained from attacking large cities and capitals even within the Sahel, and thus it remains unlikely that the militants have the inclination or capabilities to launch an attack on the aforementioned cities at this time. 
2. Regardless, this announcement and the group’s collaboration with the UNDP demonstrate the Ghanaian authorities’ heightened threat perception of militant spillover from Burkina Faso into Ghana. Although militant presence along the Ghana-Burkina Faso border remains limited, this ongoing dialogue highlights the authorities’ adoption of soft counter-militant tactics to prevent radicalization of northern Ghanaian communities, which could make it easier for militants to gain a foothold in northern Ghana.
3. FORECAST: The Ghanaian government is likely to continue soft counter-militant tactics such as dialogue within various communities of northern Ghana to foster good community relations and prevent jihadists from capitalizing on potential communal tensions to entrench themselves in the area. At the same time, the government is likely to enhance patrolling along the border with Burkina Faso to prevent militants from entering Ghana as well as Ghanaian nationals from crossing the border to join Sahelian militant groups. The authorities are also likely to establish lines of communication and deepen cooperation with Burkina Faso and other neighboring countries to share intelligence and better coordinate efforts to prevent the spillover of militancy. However,  while such efforts may somewhat curtail the spread of militancy, the latent threat of cross-border raids from Burkina Faso continues to persist.

1. We advise against all travel to the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, given the extreme risks of militancy, ethnic conflict, and violent crime.
2. Avoid all travel to northern and central Mali, including Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, Mopti, and northern Segou region, given the threat from militant and rebel groups operating in the area, as well as ongoing ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence.
3. Avoid all travel to northern and eastern Burkina Faso, particularly Sahel, Est, Centre-Est, Nord, Centre-Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions due to the ongoing threat of militancy and violent crime. Avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas of the southern and western regions due to the increased risk of attacks.
4. We advise against all travel to Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua Regions in the west along the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso, with the exception of Niamey, due to the ongoing risk of militancy.