Armed Conflict

20
Oct 2021
15:00 UTC

Syria SITUATION UPDATE: 14 killed, two wounded in IED attack targeting military bus along President Hafez al-Assad Bridge in Damascus on October 20; shows security gaps in capital

Executive Summary:

  • On October 14, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) arrested an Ansar Abu Baker al-Siddiq Squadron operative in Idlib, for offenses that include IED detonations. The group is the most significant movement attacking Turkish military convoys in the province. The arrest thus indicates a growing desire by HTS to clamp down on groups that target Turkish interests and this will likely increase tensions between such jihadist groups and HTS over the coming weeks.  
  • On October 17, The UN Special Envoy for Syria announced that the parties to the Syrian Constitutional Committee agreed on beginning to draft a new constitution. It is likely that the Syrian government decided to project compliance in order to bolster its currently growing international standing. However, the process will unlikely lead to meaningful steps pertaining to constitutional and governance reform by the government.   
  • On October 20, two IEDs attached to a military bus detonated in central Damascus, killing 14 individuals. The attack highlights the presence of a militant network within Damascus, that is capable of both gathering intelligence on government forces’ procedures as well as using powerful IEDs. 
  • Overall, pro-Syrian government forces will seek to bolster security protocols in and around Damascus over the coming days and weeks. Additional militant attacks in central Damascus over the coming weeks cannot be ruled out.   

Please be advised:

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported: 

 

Damascus 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
1  October 20  President Hafez al-Assad Bridge  Syria’s national news agency reported that two IEDs attached to a military bus detonated while it was passing over the President Hafez al-Assad Bridge during the early morning hours of October 20. The IEDs were reportedly attached to the bus prior to its travel. Security forces reportedly dismantled a third IED that had fallen off the bus. 14 people were killed and two others were wounded in the attack.   

Daraa Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
2  October 16  Jeezah    Pro-government forces entered the town after dozens of residents refused to hand over their weapons as part of a reconciliation process. 
3, 4, 5  October 17  Khirbet Ghazaleh, Western Ghariyah, Eastern Ghariyah  Reconciliation processes between pro-government forces and local residents reportedly began in the three towns. 
6, 7, 8  October 18  Elmah, Hirak, Surah   Reconciliation processes between pro-government forces and local residents reportedly began as the former entered the locales to set up centers for the collection of wanted residents’ weapons.  

 

9  October 18  Nahta   According to reports, pro-government forces entered the town and torched the houses of two residents who refused to disarm despite an existing reconciliation agreement.  

Idlib Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
  October 14  Unspecified  Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s General Security Service (GSS) announced the arrest of a suspected Ansar Abu Baker al-Siddiq Squadron operative, for several offenses, including the setting up of IEDs.  
10  October 15  Maarat Misrin  The Ansar Abu Baker al-Siddiq Squadron claimed a car bomb attack against a TSK convoy. According to the claim, an armored vehicle was destroyed and “all” occupants were killed. Reports indicate that two TSK soldiers were killed and four wounded. Turkish authorities did not confirm the casualties. 
11  October 15  Sarmada  Pro-government forces shelled several positions, including an HTS-affiliated police station. At least 4 people were killed and 13 were wounded. 
  October 17  Unspecified  HTS’s GSS announced the arrest of “most” of the members of a militant cell held responsible by the agency for an October 11 car bomb attack in Aleppo’s Turkish-controlled Afrin city. It published photos of three of them. The arrestees were allegedly involved in previous “criminal” acts. The GSS did not specify the affiliation of the cell members. Ankara held the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) responsible for the attack. 

Quneitra Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
12  October 16  Ain Eltinah 

 

According to Syria’s official news agency, a Syrian official, Medhat al-Saleh, was killed by Israeli “bullets”. Al-Saleh was born in Israeli-held Majdal Shams of the Golan Heights and served 12 years in Israeli prison for militant plots. Upon his release, he fled to Syria and served as the head of the Syrian government’s “Golan” portfolio focusing on the efforts to regain Syrian control over the Golan Heights. 
13  October 17  Al-Kusajba  An IED exploded in the car of a member of the Syrian government’s Reconciliation Committee in Quneitra, Abdullah al-Sharideh. He survived the explosion. 

as-Suweida Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
14  October 16  Saqiya  A landmine left behind by Islamic State (IS) militants killed three children and wounded an additional three people. 
15, 16, 17, 18   October 16  As-Suweida city, Qurayya, Salkhad, Mazraa  Reports indicate that locals staged sit-ins in front of bakeries to denounce the government’s rationing of bread with “smart cards.”  

Political Developments  

Date  Brief Description 
October 17  The UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, announced that the Bashar al-Assad-led government and opposition co-chairs of the Syrian Constitutional Committee agreed on beginning to draft a new Syrian constitution. This is after no progress has been made over the past two years of mediation efforts.  
October 17  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Vershinin, and the special envoy of the Russian President to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, arrived in Damascus for a meeting with Syrian President al-Assad.    

Assessments & Forecast:

HTS’s arrest operations targeting anti-Turkish militants 

The October 14 arrest of an Ansar Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Squadron militant and the October 17 dismantling of a militant cell held responsible for a car bomb attack in Afrin are notable given that HTS has rarely announced security operations against groups that directly targeted Turkish personnel and interests over the past months. The incidents come amid an overall increase in lethal attacks against Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) soldiers in northern Syria in recent weeks. It also comes amid reported recent statements both by HTS leader Muhammad al-Golani, as well as senior commanders of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advocating for increased cooperation between these groups. In this context, it is likely that HTS’s leadership has decided to take greater initiative to dismantle militant networks that undermine Turkish interests in its held territory. Ansar Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Squadron is one of the strongest elements in Idlib which actively targets Turkish forces, with occasional IED attacks against TSK convoys. HTS may have decided to increase its clampdown on such groups in order to secure Turkish tacit support. This is particularly given that Turkey is the primary regional actor directly providing assistance to rebel movements in northern Syria. FORECAST: movements such as Ansar Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Squadron target Turkish forces on religious, jihadist grounds, and HTS’s compliance with the Turkish presence in the region is a major source of contention between these groups and the HTS. Thus, the current development is likely to increase tensions between HTS and other jihadist groups that operate in its held territories. This may culminate in clashes between the parties in the coming days.  

 

The UN-led Syrian Constitutional process  

  1. The Syrian Constitutional Committee is a UN-led process in which 50 officials were nominated by the government, the Syrian opposition, and civil society, respectively, in order to facilitate reconciliation in the country. Each branch appointed 15 delegates to form the Drafting Committee of the constitution, which convened for the fifth time in January. However, the process got into a stalemate and was suspended since January, until renewed talks were currently announced by the UN special envoy. The stalemate in the process can be attributed most significantly to the Bashar al-Assad-led government’s unwillingness to cave in to the demands for genuine constitutional and governance reforms, as it continues to strive for an authoritarian grip over the country. In the period between the start of the process, approximately two years ago, and the current juncture, the Bashar al-Assad-led government has been able to further secure its grip over its held territories in Syria. This includes the very recent period whereby Syrian government forces were able to break rebel pockets in Daraa Province and bolster their presence in the province. In this context, it is unlikely that the Syrian government has changed its position with regard to the UN-led process, nor that it is under more significant pressure than before to reconcile with the process.   
  2. The current development comes at a time whereby several regional Arab states, including Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, have made steps that showed these governments’ desire to warm relations with Syria, including by way of bolstering economic activity with Damascus. It is plausible that the Bashar al-Assad-led government has decided to just formally project its willingness to comply with the UN process, in order to further this momentum of growing regional recognition of the Syrian government. It is also possible that President al-Assad believes that showing goodwill towards the UN entails a potential for sanctions relief. This is crucial for the Syrian government as more than 13 million citizens in Syria are still in need of humanitarian aid and almost 90 percent of the country’s populace live under the poverty line, as per UN statistics. FORECAST: The Syrian government is unlikely to make genuine and meaningful steps in the process of constitutional reform over the coming months.   

 

October 20 IED attack targeting a military bus in Damascus 

  1. Acts of militancy in central Damascus, particularly of such a scale, have been very rare. However, attacks in Damascus’ environs are not unprecedented. On August 4, an IED attack targeted a Republican Guard bus in the Dummar Project neighborhood, in the northwestern outskirts of Damascus. This attack was claimed by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Hurras s al-Din jihadist group whose base is in the northern Idlib Province. Prior to this, security forces foiled a militant plot on March 15 in Damascus and seized suicide vests. In addition, on August 14-15, Saraya Qaisoun claimed an RPG and machine-gun attack targeting a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) checkpoint in Western Ghouta, south of Damascus. As most of these incidents were not in the capital’s center, the current attack, which included the use of three IEDs and resulted in a significant casualty toll highlights the presence of a militant infrastructure in the area, with an ability to orchestrate attacks in the most central areas of the capital. That the attack targeted a military bus indicates that the motive of the perpetrators was to inflict casualties upon Syrian government-affiliated forces, rather than civilians. However, the location of the attack, namely on a main bus intersection at a central artery, indicates that the perpetrators were at least willing to accept collateral damage among civilians. This highlights the risk that is posed to civilians operating in central Damascus. 
  2. The latest attack remains unclaimed at the time of writing and security forces have not attributed responsibility for it to any specific group. The involvement of anti-government rebel or jihadist groups, such as Saraya Qasioun, is likely. The latter maintains an operational presence within Damascus’ environs and has claimed most of the attacks in the outskirts of the city over the past year. There is also a possibility that another militant group that is sympathetic to the rebel movement, is responsible. Such networks may have sought to demonstrate support to the rebels, particularly following developments in Daraa, where the Syrian government successfully overwhelmed rebels and has established reconciliation committees in multiple towns, in recent weeks.  
  3. Alternatively, the involvement of Islamic State (IS) militants cannot be ruled out. Although the Sunni militant group has not carried out any successful attacks within Damascus in recent years, on September 17, IS has claimed an attack against infrastructure at the Deir Ali Power Plant, approximately 27 km south of central Damascus. This was an incident that suggested that IS sleeper cells may have traveled north from the Daraa Province, in order to establish an operational capacity in areas closer to the capital. If the Sunni jihadist group’s involvement is confirmed, this would be indicative of the jihadist movement’s successful effort to establish an active presence within Syria’s capital. 
  4. Regardless of the perpetrators’ identity, the ability of the assailants to attach explosive devices to a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) bus and successfully inflict such a significant casualty toll upon it, is indicative of a heightened capability by the assailants to both gather intelligence on the operations and travel procedures of the military, as well as to manufacture or acquire relatively powerful IEDs. It also highlights the limitations in the pro-Syrian government forces’ ability to secure the capital from such attacks. FORECAST: Pro-Syrian government forces will likely review their security protocols in Damascus’ environs over the coming days and weeks, and may resort to imposing travel restrictions in certain areas of the city, including by setting checkpoints and roadblocks, amid their quest to apprehend the perpetrators. This will likely pose a challenge to militant cells operating in the city. However, given the success of the latest attack, additional acts of militancy within Damascus cannot be ruled out over the coming weeks and months. 

Recommendations:

  1. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Damascus at this time. Those continuing to operate in the city should adhere to all security precautions regarding the threat of militant attacks and potential airstrikes.  
  2. Avoid the vicinity of military installations throughout Syria as well as the Syria-Israel border area due to the persistent risk of Israeli strikes. 
  3. Those seeking to enter Syria are advised to confirm the status of crossing points at both foreign borders and within the country as well as the identity of security forces stationed at various checkpoints. In the event that a security checkpoint is encountered, act respectfully and patiently while cooperating fully with security personnel. Refrain from photographing security personnel or documenting events. 
  4. Avoid all travel to Aleppo, Hama, Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, and Raqqa provinces due to persistent armed clashes, criminal and militant activity, the heightened risk of kidnappings targeting foreigners, and very poor infrastructure. 
  5. Those remaining in Aleppo should minimize movement within the city and avoid all travel to the city’s western and northwestern districts due to periodic artillery shelling between militant groups and government forces. 
  6. Avoid nonessential travel to Latakia and Tartus given the prevalence of anti-Western sentiments, the potential for militant attacks, and poor infrastructure.  
  7. Western nationals are advised to maintain a low profile throughout Syria due to hostile sentiment towards various foreign governments among the populace.  
  8. In government-held territory, avoid making any comments or publishing online statements that are critical of the Syrian government or President Bashar al-Assad and his policies. Refrain from discussing politically sensitive topics, such as Syria’s treatment of prisoners, the Syrian civil war and various actors involved, the presence of Iran, Russian, Turkish, or American troops, or international sanctions against the Syrian government. The vocalization of these sentiments is likely to lead to detention and prosecution. 
  9. In Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-held territory in Idlib Province, cooperate with the authorities at all times and adhere to religious rules and regulations pertaining to modest dress and behavior. Refrain from vocalizing support for the Syrian government or President Assad as such activities are likely to lead to detention and potential interrogation.  
  10. In areas with strong Turkish influence or control, refrain from all criticism of Turkey and its operations in northern Syria and avoid declaring support for the Kurdish cause or the People’s Protection Unit (YPG)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 
COUNTRY RISK LEVEL Extreme
AFFECTED AREA Damascus, Daraa, Idlib, Quneitra, as-Suweida provinces; Syria
INCIDENT RISK LEVEL Extreme
STRENGTH OF SOURCE Credible

Executive Summary:

  • On October 14, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) arrested an Ansar Abu Baker al-Siddiq Squadron operative in Idlib, for offenses that include IED detonations. The group is the most significant movement attacking Turkish military convoys in the province. The arrest thus indicates a growing desire by HTS to clamp down on groups that target Turkish interests and this will likely increase tensions between such jihadist groups and HTS over the coming weeks.  
  • On October 17, The UN Special Envoy for Syria announced that the parties to the Syrian Constitutional Committee agreed on beginning to draft a new constitution. It is likely that the Syrian government decided to project compliance in order to bolster its currently growing international standing. However, the process will unlikely lead to meaningful steps pertaining to constitutional and governance reform by the government.   
  • On October 20, two IEDs attached to a military bus detonated in central Damascus, killing 14 individuals. The attack highlights the presence of a militant network within Damascus, that is capable of both gathering intelligence on government forces’ procedures as well as using powerful IEDs. 
  • Overall, pro-Syrian government forces will seek to bolster security protocols in and around Damascus over the coming days and weeks. Additional militant attacks in central Damascus over the coming weeks cannot be ruled out.   

Please be advised:

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported: 

 

Damascus 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
1  October 20  President Hafez al-Assad Bridge  Syria’s national news agency reported that two IEDs attached to a military bus detonated while it was passing over the President Hafez al-Assad Bridge during the early morning hours of October 20. The IEDs were reportedly attached to the bus prior to its travel. Security forces reportedly dismantled a third IED that had fallen off the bus. 14 people were killed and two others were wounded in the attack.   

Daraa Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
2  October 16  Jeezah    Pro-government forces entered the town after dozens of residents refused to hand over their weapons as part of a reconciliation process. 
3, 4, 5  October 17  Khirbet Ghazaleh, Western Ghariyah, Eastern Ghariyah  Reconciliation processes between pro-government forces and local residents reportedly began in the three towns. 
6, 7, 8  October 18  Elmah, Hirak, Surah   Reconciliation processes between pro-government forces and local residents reportedly began as the former entered the locales to set up centers for the collection of wanted residents’ weapons.  

 

9  October 18  Nahta   According to reports, pro-government forces entered the town and torched the houses of two residents who refused to disarm despite an existing reconciliation agreement.  

Idlib Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
  October 14  Unspecified  Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s General Security Service (GSS) announced the arrest of a suspected Ansar Abu Baker al-Siddiq Squadron operative, for several offenses, including the setting up of IEDs.  
10  October 15  Maarat Misrin  The Ansar Abu Baker al-Siddiq Squadron claimed a car bomb attack against a TSK convoy. According to the claim, an armored vehicle was destroyed and “all” occupants were killed. Reports indicate that two TSK soldiers were killed and four wounded. Turkish authorities did not confirm the casualties. 
11  October 15  Sarmada  Pro-government forces shelled several positions, including an HTS-affiliated police station. At least 4 people were killed and 13 were wounded. 
  October 17  Unspecified  HTS’s GSS announced the arrest of “most” of the members of a militant cell held responsible by the agency for an October 11 car bomb attack in Aleppo’s Turkish-controlled Afrin city. It published photos of three of them. The arrestees were allegedly involved in previous “criminal” acts. The GSS did not specify the affiliation of the cell members. Ankara held the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) responsible for the attack. 

Quneitra Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
12  October 16  Ain Eltinah 

 

According to Syria’s official news agency, a Syrian official, Medhat al-Saleh, was killed by Israeli “bullets”. Al-Saleh was born in Israeli-held Majdal Shams of the Golan Heights and served 12 years in Israeli prison for militant plots. Upon his release, he fled to Syria and served as the head of the Syrian government’s “Golan” portfolio focusing on the efforts to regain Syrian control over the Golan Heights. 
13  October 17  Al-Kusajba  An IED exploded in the car of a member of the Syrian government’s Reconciliation Committee in Quneitra, Abdullah al-Sharideh. He survived the explosion. 

as-Suweida Province 

Map #  Date  Location  Brief Description 
14  October 16  Saqiya  A landmine left behind by Islamic State (IS) militants killed three children and wounded an additional three people. 
15, 16, 17, 18   October 16  As-Suweida city, Qurayya, Salkhad, Mazraa  Reports indicate that locals staged sit-ins in front of bakeries to denounce the government’s rationing of bread with “smart cards.”  

Political Developments  

Date  Brief Description 
October 17  The UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, announced that the Bashar al-Assad-led government and opposition co-chairs of the Syrian Constitutional Committee agreed on beginning to draft a new Syrian constitution. This is after no progress has been made over the past two years of mediation efforts.  
October 17  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Vershinin, and the special envoy of the Russian President to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, arrived in Damascus for a meeting with Syrian President al-Assad.    

Assessments & Forecast:

HTS’s arrest operations targeting anti-Turkish militants 

The October 14 arrest of an Ansar Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Squadron militant and the October 17 dismantling of a militant cell held responsible for a car bomb attack in Afrin are notable given that HTS has rarely announced security operations against groups that directly targeted Turkish personnel and interests over the past months. The incidents come amid an overall increase in lethal attacks against Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) soldiers in northern Syria in recent weeks. It also comes amid reported recent statements both by HTS leader Muhammad al-Golani, as well as senior commanders of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advocating for increased cooperation between these groups. In this context, it is likely that HTS’s leadership has decided to take greater initiative to dismantle militant networks that undermine Turkish interests in its held territory. Ansar Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Squadron is one of the strongest elements in Idlib which actively targets Turkish forces, with occasional IED attacks against TSK convoys. HTS may have decided to increase its clampdown on such groups in order to secure Turkish tacit support. This is particularly given that Turkey is the primary regional actor directly providing assistance to rebel movements in northern Syria. FORECAST: movements such as Ansar Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Squadron target Turkish forces on religious, jihadist grounds, and HTS’s compliance with the Turkish presence in the region is a major source of contention between these groups and the HTS. Thus, the current development is likely to increase tensions between HTS and other jihadist groups that operate in its held territories. This may culminate in clashes between the parties in the coming days.  

 

The UN-led Syrian Constitutional process  

  1. The Syrian Constitutional Committee is a UN-led process in which 50 officials were nominated by the government, the Syrian opposition, and civil society, respectively, in order to facilitate reconciliation in the country. Each branch appointed 15 delegates to form the Drafting Committee of the constitution, which convened for the fifth time in January. However, the process got into a stalemate and was suspended since January, until renewed talks were currently announced by the UN special envoy. The stalemate in the process can be attributed most significantly to the Bashar al-Assad-led government’s unwillingness to cave in to the demands for genuine constitutional and governance reforms, as it continues to strive for an authoritarian grip over the country. In the period between the start of the process, approximately two years ago, and the current juncture, the Bashar al-Assad-led government has been able to further secure its grip over its held territories in Syria. This includes the very recent period whereby Syrian government forces were able to break rebel pockets in Daraa Province and bolster their presence in the province. In this context, it is unlikely that the Syrian government has changed its position with regard to the UN-led process, nor that it is under more significant pressure than before to reconcile with the process.   
  2. The current development comes at a time whereby several regional Arab states, including Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, have made steps that showed these governments’ desire to warm relations with Syria, including by way of bolstering economic activity with Damascus. It is plausible that the Bashar al-Assad-led government has decided to just formally project its willingness to comply with the UN process, in order to further this momentum of growing regional recognition of the Syrian government. It is also possible that President al-Assad believes that showing goodwill towards the UN entails a potential for sanctions relief. This is crucial for the Syrian government as more than 13 million citizens in Syria are still in need of humanitarian aid and almost 90 percent of the country’s populace live under the poverty line, as per UN statistics. FORECAST: The Syrian government is unlikely to make genuine and meaningful steps in the process of constitutional reform over the coming months.   

 

October 20 IED attack targeting a military bus in Damascus 

  1. Acts of militancy in central Damascus, particularly of such a scale, have been very rare. However, attacks in Damascus’ environs are not unprecedented. On August 4, an IED attack targeted a Republican Guard bus in the Dummar Project neighborhood, in the northwestern outskirts of Damascus. This attack was claimed by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Hurras s al-Din jihadist group whose base is in the northern Idlib Province. Prior to this, security forces foiled a militant plot on March 15 in Damascus and seized suicide vests. In addition, on August 14-15, Saraya Qaisoun claimed an RPG and machine-gun attack targeting a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) checkpoint in Western Ghouta, south of Damascus. As most of these incidents were not in the capital’s center, the current attack, which included the use of three IEDs and resulted in a significant casualty toll highlights the presence of a militant infrastructure in the area, with an ability to orchestrate attacks in the most central areas of the capital. That the attack targeted a military bus indicates that the motive of the perpetrators was to inflict casualties upon Syrian government-affiliated forces, rather than civilians. However, the location of the attack, namely on a main bus intersection at a central artery, indicates that the perpetrators were at least willing to accept collateral damage among civilians. This highlights the risk that is posed to civilians operating in central Damascus. 
  2. The latest attack remains unclaimed at the time of writing and security forces have not attributed responsibility for it to any specific group. The involvement of anti-government rebel or jihadist groups, such as Saraya Qasioun, is likely. The latter maintains an operational presence within Damascus’ environs and has claimed most of the attacks in the outskirts of the city over the past year. There is also a possibility that another militant group that is sympathetic to the rebel movement, is responsible. Such networks may have sought to demonstrate support to the rebels, particularly following developments in Daraa, where the Syrian government successfully overwhelmed rebels and has established reconciliation committees in multiple towns, in recent weeks.  
  3. Alternatively, the involvement of Islamic State (IS) militants cannot be ruled out. Although the Sunni militant group has not carried out any successful attacks within Damascus in recent years, on September 17, IS has claimed an attack against infrastructure at the Deir Ali Power Plant, approximately 27 km south of central Damascus. This was an incident that suggested that IS sleeper cells may have traveled north from the Daraa Province, in order to establish an operational capacity in areas closer to the capital. If the Sunni jihadist group’s involvement is confirmed, this would be indicative of the jihadist movement’s successful effort to establish an active presence within Syria’s capital. 
  4. Regardless of the perpetrators’ identity, the ability of the assailants to attach explosive devices to a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) bus and successfully inflict such a significant casualty toll upon it, is indicative of a heightened capability by the assailants to both gather intelligence on the operations and travel procedures of the military, as well as to manufacture or acquire relatively powerful IEDs. It also highlights the limitations in the pro-Syrian government forces’ ability to secure the capital from such attacks. FORECAST: Pro-Syrian government forces will likely review their security protocols in Damascus’ environs over the coming days and weeks, and may resort to imposing travel restrictions in certain areas of the city, including by setting checkpoints and roadblocks, amid their quest to apprehend the perpetrators. This will likely pose a challenge to militant cells operating in the city. However, given the success of the latest attack, additional acts of militancy within Damascus cannot be ruled out over the coming weeks and months. 

Recommendations:

  1. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Damascus at this time. Those continuing to operate in the city should adhere to all security precautions regarding the threat of militant attacks and potential airstrikes.  
  2. Avoid the vicinity of military installations throughout Syria as well as the Syria-Israel border area due to the persistent risk of Israeli strikes. 
  3. Those seeking to enter Syria are advised to confirm the status of crossing points at both foreign borders and within the country as well as the identity of security forces stationed at various checkpoints. In the event that a security checkpoint is encountered, act respectfully and patiently while cooperating fully with security personnel. Refrain from photographing security personnel or documenting events. 
  4. Avoid all travel to Aleppo, Hama, Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, and Raqqa provinces due to persistent armed clashes, criminal and militant activity, the heightened risk of kidnappings targeting foreigners, and very poor infrastructure. 
  5. Those remaining in Aleppo should minimize movement within the city and avoid all travel to the city’s western and northwestern districts due to periodic artillery shelling between militant groups and government forces. 
  6. Avoid nonessential travel to Latakia and Tartus given the prevalence of anti-Western sentiments, the potential for militant attacks, and poor infrastructure.  
  7. Western nationals are advised to maintain a low profile throughout Syria due to hostile sentiment towards various foreign governments among the populace.  
  8. In government-held territory, avoid making any comments or publishing online statements that are critical of the Syrian government or President Bashar al-Assad and his policies. Refrain from discussing politically sensitive topics, such as Syria’s treatment of prisoners, the Syrian civil war and various actors involved, the presence of Iran, Russian, Turkish, or American troops, or international sanctions against the Syrian government. The vocalization of these sentiments is likely to lead to detention and prosecution. 
  9. In Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-held territory in Idlib Province, cooperate with the authorities at all times and adhere to religious rules and regulations pertaining to modest dress and behavior. Refrain from vocalizing support for the Syrian government or President Assad as such activities are likely to lead to detention and potential interrogation.  
  10. In areas with strong Turkish influence or control, refrain from all criticism of Turkey and its operations in northern Syria and avoid declaring support for the Kurdish cause or the People’s Protection Unit (YPG)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 
COUNTRY RISK LEVEL Extreme
AFFECTED AREA Damascus, Daraa, Idlib, Quneitra, as-Suweida provinces; Syria
INCIDENT RISK LEVEL Extreme
STRENGTH OF SOURCE Credible