• On November 24, the US expanded licensing options for NGOs operating in Syria, authorizing the provision of services and funds transfer, including to or through the Syrian government, for some activities. This will significantly alleviate restrictions on NGOs’ ability to provide services and slightly alleviate the humanitarian situation in the country.
• However, this will also provide opportunities for the Syrian government and its allies to exploit the situation, gain revenues, and advance their interests through front civil society groups.  
• On November 27, a car bomb exploded in Aleppo’s Manbij city, killing civilians. It is plausible that Turkish-backed from their areas of control west of Manbij perpetrated the attack, as part of their interest in destabilizing the authority of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Regardless, the incident currently does not point towards an increased risk of hostilities in Manbij. 
• Between November 29-30, pro-government forces shelled Nawa in Daraa Province against the backdrop of attacks against pro-government forces. This marks the largest outbreak of hostilities in Daraa since the reconciliation process between rebels and the government. The hostilities highlight the fragility of the ceasefire and hostilities may expand in the region over the coming days.  
• Overall, given the increasing strategic importance of the Daraa Province for the Syrian government, against the backdrop of invigorated economic activity with Jordan and other regional schemes, the Syrian government will likely resort to employing extensive force in the province to project that it will firmly quell any form of renewed resistance.

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported: 

Aleppo Province 

Daraa Province 

Deir Ezzor Province 

Idlib Province 

Raqqa Province  

Political Developments 

US amends laws pertaining to NGOs operating in Syria  

1. The US administration’s decision to amend the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR) signifies a marked shift in Washington’s foreign policy, particularly with regards to the implementation of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act which was introduced in 2019 by former US President Donald Trump. During Trump’s tenure, Washington was uncompromising in its enforcement of the Caesar Act and actively sought to sanction individuals and establishments for providing funding or assistance to the Bashar al-Assad-led Syrian government. The Trump administration issued more than 100 sanctions against such individuals during the final six months of his tenure. This strategy was criticized by some international aid organizations as they alleged that the Caesar Act inhibited NGOs’ ability to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance in Syria. This is because the legislation enabled the US to sanction entities, including NGOs, for engaging in activities in the construction, engineering, and energy sectors in the country, which also benefit Syria’s populace.  
2. In contrast to the Trump administration, the current US President Joe Biden has only issued one round of Syria-related sanctions since assuming office in January 2021. This decrease, coupled with the latest SySR amendments, indicates President Biden viewed the previous administration’s frequent sanctioning as failing to bring about sufficient political change in Syria as well as further exacerbating the country’s already dire humanitarian crisis. On a broader level, the amendments are aligned with the Biden administration’s strategy of allocating increased resources towards addressing humanitarian issues across the region, as part of Washington’s foreign policy framework. The November announcement also represents an extension of recent US measures aimed at influencing Syria’s geopolitical, economic, and security landscape without Washington directly engaging with the Syrian government. This is evidenced in the US-supported initiative to provide Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity to Lebanon through Syria’s infrastructure which has facilitated several official meetings and agreements between Syrian government officials and ministers from its neighboring countries, including US allies, in recent months. FORECAST: The US will likely continue to issue its tacit support for measures aimed at rehabilitating Syrian infrastructure and economy in the coming months. This is because the US likely perceives a more stable Syria to be less susceptible to Iran’s ambitions of expanding its entrenchment in the country, which the US views as a destabilizing factor. 
3. From an NGO perspective, the SySR amendments will enable aid organizations to engage in a broad range of humanitarian projects, such as the construction of schools and housing, that were previously sidelined due to fear of being sanctioned by the US. FORECAST: There will likely be an increase in the number of NGOs operating in Syria in the coming months as a result of the amendments. This, in turn, is likely to prompt a slight improvement in the humanitarian situation in the country as NGO development projects will help foster an increased number of employment opportunities as well as improved access to essential services such as healthcare. That said, these organizations’ ability to bring about significant change in this regard will be largely limited due to the ongoing civil war, which crippled the national economy and forcibly displaced approximately 13.5 million Syrians, as well as an ongoing significant drought that continues to have an adverse impact on the country’s agricultural sector. 
4. FORECAST: Additionally, the easing of restrictions on aid organizations operating in the country will also open opportunities for the President Bashar al-Assad-led government and its supporters to circumvent US sanctions by engaging in fraudulent activity and making transactions through front civil groups and NGOs. For example, under the new regulations, Syrian government affiliates would have more opportunities in establishing front NGOs to purchase and deal with refined petroleum products, and potentially engage in illicit activities and make revenue. This would include purchasing products in order to smuggle them within or out of Syria. To counter such scenarios, the US will likely seek to implement stringent oversight mechanisms aimed at thoroughly vetting NGOs operating in the country and may sanction some of them. However, preventing fraudulent activity, in its entirety, will prove challenging for the US authorities in the coming months. 

Car bomb attack in Aleppo’s Manbij  

The explosion that killed at least four civilians and wounded several others is a relatively rare occurrence in central Manbij, in which the security environment is overall stable. That said, such incidents are not unprecedented as illustrated by a similar IED attack near a mosque in the city on March 2 that reportedly wounded one civilian and five SDF personnel. IS is the most prominent militant group operating within SDF-held areas in northern Syria. This, as well as the MMC co-chair’s description of the incident as an “act of terrorism”, points to the possibility that an IS sleeper cell conducted the attack. However, this remains less likely at the current juncture, given that IS is not known to operate on such a scale within Manbij or assemble car bombs. The closest prominent areas of operations where the jihadists are active are in the desert areas of southern Aleppo Province, as well as around Raqqa, approximately 100 km south and southeast of Manbij, respectively. Alternatively, given that Manbij is a relatively large city located close to the areas disputed by the SDF and Turkish-backed forces, it is plausible that elements affiliated with the latter perpetrated the attack, which could have been intended to target SDF forces. This would have been part of the Turkish-backed forces’ overall desire to destabilize SDF control in areas close to the frontlines between the parties. FORECAST: While similar attacks may recur, the incident currently does not point towards an increased risk of hostilities in Manbij over the coming days. 

Escalation in Daraa Governorate’s Nawa 

1. The incidents recorded in Daraa’s Nawa in recent days constitute the largest outbreak of hostilities reported in the Daraa Province since the reconciliation process between the Syrian government and local rebel pockets in September-October. This highlights the fragility of the ceasefire in the province. The attacks against pro-government forces in the area likely increased their perception that rebel pockets are still active in the town and are attempting to target government-affiliated fighters. This was likely the immediate trigger for the SAA’s response. The strategic importance of Daraa Province for the Syrian government is currently significantly increasing, particularly in light of the reopening of the Jaber Border Crossing by Jordan as well as the adjacent Jordanian-Syrian Joint Industrial Free Zone. Furthermore, beginning in early 2022, the Syrian government is expecting to start receiving natural gas and electricity from Egypt and Jordan through infrastructure located in Daraa and transfer them to Lebanon. This is also expected to partially alleviate the energy crisis in Syria. This likely increases the Syrian government’s interest in projecting that it will firmly quell any form of resistance, thereby prompting its latest response. FORECAST: However, the SAA’s actions could also trigger Nawa’s residents to resort to violence, particularly given that casualties were recorded among the local populace. It is therefore plausible that tensions in the area and tit-for-tat hostilities will persist over the coming days. 
2. Furthermore, in light of the scale of the shelling, it cannot be ruled out that armed elements in other parts of the province who still adhere to the rebel cause may seek to launch attacks against pro-government forces across Daraa. This potentially includes areas near the Syria-Jordan border, the M5 Highway that connects the Jaber Border Crossing to Damascus, and within Daraa city itself. FORECAST: Should this materialize, it would further deteriorate Daraa’s security environment and prompt the SAA to launch additional operations in the province.   

1. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Damascus at this time. Those continuing to operate in the city should adhere to all security precautions regarding the threat of militant attacks and potential airstrikes.  
2. Avoid the vicinity of military installations throughout Syria as well as the Syria-Israel border area due to the persistent risk of Israeli strikes. 
3. Those seeking to enter Syria are advised to confirm the status of crossing points at both foreign borders and within the country as well as the identity of security forces stationed at various checkpoints. In the event that a security checkpoint is encountered, act respectfully and patiently while cooperating fully with security personnel. Refrain from photographing security personnel or documenting events. 
4. Avoid all travel to Aleppo, Hama, Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, and Raqqa provinces due to persistent armed clashes, criminal and militant activity, the heightened risk of kidnappings targeting foreigners, and very poor infrastructure. 
5. Those remaining in Aleppo should minimize movement within the city and avoid all travel to the city’s western and northwestern districts due to periodic artillery shelling between militant groups and government forces. 
6. Avoid nonessential travel to Latakia and Tartus given the prevalence of anti-Western sentiments, the potential for militant attacks, and poor infrastructure. 
7. Western nationals are advised to maintain a low profile throughout Syria due to hostile sentiment towards various foreign governments among the populace. 
8. In government-held territory, avoid making any comments or publishing online statements that are critical of the Syrian government or President Bashar al-Assad and his policies. Refrain from discussing politically sensitive topics, such as Syria’s treatment of prisoners, the Syrian civil war and various actors involved, the presence of Iran, Russian, Turkish, or American troops, or international sanctions against the Syrian government. The vocalization of these sentiments is likely to lead to detention and prosecution.
9. In Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-held territory in Idlib Province, cooperate with the authorities at all times and adhere to religious rules and regulations pertaining to modest dress and behavior. Refrain from vocalizing support for the Syrian government or President Assad as such activities are likely to lead to detention and potential interrogation.  
10. In areas with strong Turkish influence or control, refrain from all criticism of Turkey and its operations in northern Syria and avoid declaring support for the Kurdish cause or the People’s Protection Unit (YPG)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).