• Several security-related incidents were recorded in Aden between January 28 and February 1, including an attack against the headquarters of an international organization and a VBIED explosion along a road located north of Aden International Airport. This underscores the exceedingly destabilized security environment in Aden. 
• On February 4, US President Joe Biden announced the end of all American support for the Saudi-led offensive in Yemen. This constitutes a reversal of US’s policy vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, which Washington has supported since 2015.
• According to February 6 reports, the US Congress has been “formally notified” of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s “intent” to remove the Houthis from the list of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTO). The revocation is likely based on the fact that the designation is liable to hinder potential peace talks to resolve the ongoing conflict in Yemen.
• On February 4, the UN confirmed the arrest of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Khalid Batarfi in an operation in Mahra Governorate’s al-Ghaydah in October 2020. This highlights that AQAP has suffered significant leadership losses over the past year, which likely explains its overall diminished activity and recent lack of formal claims.
• Overall, despite the end of US support for the Saudi-led Coalition and potential revocation of the FTO designation, the Houthis are unlikely to alter their strategy vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia over the coming weeks and months. Therefore, the Shiite group will continue to conduct cross-border attacks to pressure the former to end its offensive and lift the blockade over Houthi-held territories.

Current Situation:

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported:

Aden Governorate

al-Jawf Governorate

Amran Governorate

Hadramout Governorate

Marib Governorate

Saada Governorate

Sanaa Governorate

Taiz Governorate

Jazan Province; Saudi Arabia

General Developments

1. The series of security incidents reported in Aden between January 28 and February 1 highlight the persistent gaps in security protocols and the overall destabilized security environment throughout Aden. The January 29 attack against the headquarters of an international organization in Khormaksar is notable due to the rarity of attacks against such targets. However, it is not unprecedented, as was highlighted on December 31, 2020, when an IED attack was hurled at a French humanitarian organization building in Khormaksar as well. Such attacks on international organizations are often based on the perpetrators’ general anti-Western sentiments or the perception that these organizations are advancing the interest of opposing local groups. This is particularly in light of the recently heightened political tensions in Aden, stemming from opposition to the joint Hadi-Southern Transitional Council (STC) government.
2. Meanwhile, the VBIED attack in Khormaksar on January 31 is also notable given that it occurred along a road that borders the Aden International Airport compound on its north. The unconfirmed reports suggesting that the target of the attack could have been a convoy of a local military commander is credible. This is based on the fact that politically-motivated attacks, including against military and security personnel are relatively frequent in southern Yemen. Additionally, given that several military camps are located in the immediate surrounding of the Aden International Airport, including the Nasr Military Camp along Khat al-Mamlah Road, military convoys likely frequent this particular area. This highlights that the risk posed by elements seeking to conduct targeted assassination attacks extends to the vicinity of sensitive locales, including the airport in Aden. FORECAST: Overall, under the volatile security climate, additional assassination attempts, IED explosions, and small to medium-scale confrontations between various militias are likely to be recorded across Aden over the coming days and weeks. 
3. On February 4, US President Joe Biden announced his plan to end US support for the Saudi-led offensive, including all “relevant arms sales”. This constitutes a major reversal of US policy vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia’s offensive in Yemen. Washington has supported the Saudi-led offensive in Yemen since 2015 under former presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. This follows the Biden administration’s January 27 announcement that it was pausing the sale of precision-guided munitions, worth aprroximately 478 million USD to Saudi Arabia, which was approved by the State Department in December 2020 despite objections within the US Congress. FORECAST: The latest decision would likely entail the end of intelligence sharing and logistical support from the US, which would thereby hinder Saudi Arabia’s operational capabilities in Yemen. Additionally, should the Biden administration decide to continue to limit the sale of offensive arms to Saudi Arabia in the future, it will likely have an impact on Riyadh’s aerial campaign targeting Houthi sites and its ability to provide military support for the anti-Houthi forces.
4. Additionally, according to February 6 reports, the Biden administration reportedly notified members of Congress of its intention to revoke the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation on the Houthi forces, which came into effect on January 19, on the last day of the Trump presidency. This highlights the current US government’s perception that the FTO designation is counterproductive to the long-term objective of promoting dialogue and peace talks with the Houthis. However, the Houthis may perceive Washington’s rescission of the label as a symbol of weakness, given that the latter did not fully utilize the leverage it gained from the designation to negotiate any concessions from the Shiite group. FORECAST: Such a perception may embolden the Houthis, which may lead it to challenge the Hadi government along active frontlines in governorates such as Marib and al-Jawf. This is bolstered by reports of a resurgence of Houthi-initiated attacks in Marib, as evidenced by missile attacks targeting the Tadaween camp on February 6, and Marib city on February 7. Furthermore, the Houthis will continue their cross-border campaign to pressure the Kingdom to end its offensive and lift its blockade on Houthi territories, as witnessed by the launching of at least six explosives-laden UAVs on February 7-8.
5. The UN’s February 4 confirmation that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Emir Khalid Batarfi was arrested in a counter-militancy operation in Mahra Governorate’s al-Ghaydah on October 4, 2020, is highly notable and lends credence to previous unconfirmed speculations of Batarfi’s arrest during the same security raid. The fact that AQAP’s second in command was also killed in the October 2020 operation highlights that the Sunni jihadist group has suffered significant leadership losses over the past year since the killing of its previous Emir Qasim al-Rimi in January 2020. This likely explains the relative decrease in formal claims of attacks by the group and its overall diminished activity in Yemen over the past year. Several sources, including the UN, have also noted that AQAP is suffering an erosion of its ranks caused by dissents and desertions, which has further contributed to its waning capabilities in Yemen.
6. However, despite these developments, AQAP was able to mount a significant attack in Abyan Governorate’s Lawdar on December 7, 2020, leading to the death of five Security Belt Forces (SBF) personnel, which underscores the continued threat that the group poses to the country’s security environment.  FORECAST: This furthermore points to the AQAP’s ability to function in a decentralized manner, which indicates that militants affiliated with the group will continue to conduct attacks against its opponents, especially UAE-backed forces in southern governorates such as Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramout. Given that the UN’s confirmation is likely to have a negative impact on the AQAP’s overall influence, the Sunni group will likely continue to recirculate Batarfi’s old videos and speeches, as witnessed over recent days and weeks, in a continued effort to maintain its propaganda outreach. 

1. It is advised to avoid all travel to Sanaa and Aden.
2. In the event of air strikes, it is advised to take shelter in a basement or on the second story level of a concrete building away from windows and the entrance. If no such areas are available, it is advised to take cover under a sturdy object in the center of the home away from windows; lay on the ground while covering your head with your hands.
3. We advise against all travel to outlying areas and overland travel, due to the limited government and security presence, ongoing clashes and airstrikes, as well as the heightened threat of attacks and kidnappings.
4. For those operating in or conducting business with oil facilities, it is advised to consult with us for itinerary and contingency support plans.
5. Foreigners, particularly Westerners, continuing to operate in Yemen are additionally advised to maintain a low profile, exercise heightened vigilance, and avoid locales frequented by foreign, particularly Western nationals. To mitigate the risk of attacks or abductions, ensure that places of stay are equipped with sufficient perimeter security details, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.