• On August 2, the Presidential Command Council (PCC) and the Houthis agreed to extend the ceasefire agreement for two months until October 2. Both sides are likely to uphold the renewed truce, which will likely help further stabilize the security environment during the extended period.  
• On July 9, Islamic State (IS)-affiliated Wilayat Yemen claimed a suicide bombing attack against the Houthis in Bayda’s al-Malajim. This claim is notable given the absence of Wilayat Yemen-claimed attacks since August 2020, except in one other instance.  
• Between July 15-20, clashes were recorded in Shabwa between UAE-backed Shabwa Defense Forces (SDF) and the Special Security Forces (SSF) linked to the Muslim Brotherhood-linked al-Islah Party. This underlines the political differences between various factions within the anti-Houthi camp.  
• Overall, the major points of negotiations during the renewed truce will be focused on re-opening the roads of Taiz Governorate and the disbursing of civil servants’ salaries in Houthi-held areas. Both sides are likely to uphold the truce for the next 60 days, which will likely continue to improve the quality of civilian lives and humanitarian measures in the short term.  

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported:

Abyan Governorate 

Aden Governorate 

Bayda Governorate 

Dali Governorate 

Dhamar Governorate 

Hadramout Governorate 

Sanaa Governorate 

Shabwa Governorate 

Taiz Governorate 

General Developments 

UN mediated truce agreement renewed for second time until October 2  

1. On August 2, UN special Envoy for Yemen announced that the Presidential Command Council (PCC) and the Houthis have agreed to extend the ceasefire until October 2 under the same conditions as the initial April 2 truce. The extension came hours after an Omani delegation concluded a three-day discussion with Houthi leader Abdul Malek al-Houthi in Sanaa. While the extension of the ceasefire constitutes a positive step, the two sides continue to share several points of contention amid the Houthis’ new demands.  
2. Over the last four months, 24 commercial flights have reportedly travelled to and from Sanaa airport, carrying more than 9000 passengers. The PCC claims that the number of passengers traveling to and from Sanaa airport could have been significantly higher if the Houthis did not restrict several citizens like civil society activists from travel. Nonetheless, the Houthis have now reportedly demanded for flights to cater to at least eight new destinations apart from Amman and Cairo.  
3. Additionally, between April 2 and July 21, 26 fuel ships have entered via the Houthi held Hodeidah port carrying 720,270 metric tons of fuel derivatives. However, the disbursement of the revenue collected from the fuel imports continues to remain a contentious issue. The Saudi-backed government has long accused the Houthis of directing the fuel revenues to finance military efforts instead of paying the salaries of civil servants residing in Houthi-controlled areas. For instance, the Houthis reportedly diverted 1.8 billion USD to fund its military in 2019. The Shiite group has instead called on the Saudi-backed government to pay the salaries. 
4. The Houthis’ have also refused to re-open the roads it controls in Taiz and other governorates despite several rounds of negotiations and updated proposals by the UN including in late July. While the Houthis offered a gradual reopening of the roads, they ultimately only announced the opening of minor roads, including the 50-60 road deemed by the PCC as constructed by the Houthis in recent months. This indicates that the Shiite group likely does not want to give up its military advantage it possesses by controlling the main roads to Taiz city. Furthermore, violations of the truce have been reported by both sides during the ceasefire period. For instance, the PCC condemned the July 24 artillery shelling attack by the Houthis in Taiz which killed a child, while the Houthis have frequently claimed violations of by government forces in Hodeidah and other governorates.  
5. Overall, these new Houthi demands coupled with the group’s refusal to re-open roads in Taiz, and the publicization of Houthi attacks that have resulted in civilian casualties has created the perception among the PCC and its supporters that the Houthis are not interested in pursuing a real chance at ending the conflict. The Shiite group is viewed by many as utilizing international actors such Saudi Arabia and the UN’s interest in winding down the civil conflict to gain as many concessions by constantly upping the ante with new demands. The PCC’s replacement of several cabinet ministers including for defense as well as the governors of Socotra and Hadramout, who is currently part of the PCC, also signals that the new government is still in the stages of finding its footing to stabilize the political and economic situation amid the current peace.  
6. FORECAST: Over the coming weeks, the PCC government will likely push the re-opening of roads more strongly before it concedes to any of the Houthis’ recent demands. Should both parties reach a resolution on the Taiz issue, further confidence-building measures may take place between the two. However, if the Houthis continue to defer meaningful concessions on this front, and withhold the opportunity for the PCC to project some success its supporters, it may further aggravate tensions. Nonetheless, both sides are likely to broadly uphold the ceasefire for the next two months, which will continue to have a positive impact on civilian lives and humanitarian measures in the country at least in the short term.   
   

Wilayat Yemen claims IED attack on Houthis in Bayda 

1. Wilayat Yemen’s July 9 claim of having conducted an attack in Bayda is notable as it came after its operations in Yemen had virtually ceased since August 2020. At the time, the group claimed to have clashed with Houthi forces in Wadi al-Nawash, located in Qifa’s al-Zahra, resulting in 60 Houthi casualties. However, the group has since maintained a limited presence as evidenced by the publication of its pledge of allegiance to IS’ new Emir Abu al-Hassan al-Qurashi on March 12, 2022. In this context, the latest attack against a Houthi convoy in al-Malajim shows Wilayat Yemen’s continued presence in Yemen’s militancy arena, and also showcases their ability to track Houthi movements and inflict casualties among its fighters. Additionally, the fact that the attack took place in al-Malajim is significant as Wilayat Yemen has not conducted an attack in central Bayda district in the past. The timing of the attack is also notable, as it likely intended to project the group’s active status and boost its supporters’ morale during Eid al-Adha. This was further likely meant to bolster the group’s image amongst the local Sunni population, which opposes the presence of the Shiite Houthis in Bayda, to attract support and new recruits. 
2. The reported arrests of two senior Wilayat Yemen members by anti-Houthi forces in Hadramout on July 17 is also notable, as they marked the first arrests of alleged high-ranking Wilayat Yemen members since the anti-Houthi forces’ arrest of the former’s leader in 2019. Should the arrest reports be confirmed, it indicates that the jihadist group still maintains a presence in other parts of southern Yemen. That said, it is possible that through these reports, authorities wished to only portray that they maintain heightened vigilance to clamp down and dismantle the top leadership of Wilayat Yemen. The timing of the reports, coming days after Wilayat Sinai’s claim of attack in Bayda, adds to this possibility. FORECAST: Similar claims of high-profile counter-militancy arrests will therefore continue over the coming days and weeks, as authorities will likely seek to show their abilities in eradicating militant presence in southern Yemen. That said, regardless of Wilayat Yemen’s recent claim, the significant downtick in Wilayat Yemen’s operations since August 2020 indicates that the group is unlikely to be able to extensively expand its operations or capabilities in Yemen at the current juncture. 

Clashes between SDF-SSF in Shabwa’s Ataq 

1. Clashes between the UAE-backed Shabwa Defense Forces (SDF) (previously the Shabwani Elite Forces) and forces linked to the al-Islah Party have periodically been reported in Shabwa. Such incidents have picked up pace in 2022 following the replacement of the erstwhile pro-Islah governor with current governor Awadh bin al-Awlaki in late December 2021, and following the anti-Houthi forces’ securing control of the governorate from the Houthis in January. For instance, in June, multiple incidents of clashes between the two sides were recorded in the capital Ataq following the Islah-aligned forces’ reported rejections of the governor’s security-related decisions.  
2. That said, the period of clashes between July 15-20 is notable as it involved the governor’s suspension of Abd Rabbo Lakab, commander of the Islah-aligned Special Security Forces (SSF), and Wajdi Baoum, a commander in the SDF, on July 24. This shows Awlaki’s attempt to immediately defuse tensions by holding both the UAE-backed and Islah-backed forces responsible for the initial clashes to portray being unbiased and to prevent the precarious security situation from spiraling out of control throughout Shabwa. This was also likely done to impose his authority in the governorate, particularly during a time when anti-Houthi forces in southern Yemen, including in Shabwa, have reportedly been mobilizing to conduct large-scale counter-militancy operations aimed at eradicating AQAP’s remaining presence.   
3. Nonetheless, sporadic targeted attacks on both sides, such as the August 1 IED attack on an SDF patrol in al-Sawda, have continued since the suspensions. This indicates that neither side is willing to fully accept Awlaki’s terms, and on the contrary wish to portray that they are willing to carry out attacks despite their high-ranking commanders being sacked. That said, sustained clashes between both sides, on the scale of the July 15-20 violence, have not been reported in recent days. This points towards the possibility of both the SDF and Islah-aligned forces partly adhering to the status quo in order to prevent a further escalation in violence. FORECAST: The initial clashes between July 15-20 are therefore unlikely to lead to a protracted conflict between the SDF and Islah-aligned forces. That said, it is possible that sporadic clashes may take place, particularly in the event that either side perceives the other to be infringing upon its areas of dominance. It is more likely that one-off symbolic attacks, such as the July 26 hand grenade attack targeting the Islah Party’s headquarters in Ataq, will take place in the short term.  
4. On August 1, Awlaki stated that “senior officials” were behind the recent events in Shabwa. This statement could be alluding to pro-Islah members of the PCC-led government, such as Interior Minister Ibrahim Haidan, as being behind an alleged plot to interfere with his governance. This points towards the potential for political and even military divisions between various factions within the PCC umbrella. FORECAST: The latest incidents in Shabwa are liable to elicit a response from the Aden-based PCC, potentially in the form of brokering talks between political factions linked with or sympathetic to the SDF and al-Islah. This is because the PCC will particularly seek to portray a united front in the coming weeks over the course of the latest renewed truce, which will also likely include attempts at getting various factions on the same page to counter militancy in Yemen’s southern districts during this period. 

1. Avoid all travel to Sanaa and Aden, while consulting with us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for custom risk assessments and contingency plans. 
2. In the event of airstrikes throughout Yemen, it is advised to take cover in a designated shelter, or if one does not exist, in a room with as few external walls, windows and openings as possible, close all openings, sit on the floor below the window line and near an internal wall. 
3. Check the operational status of airports in Yemen, including Aden International Airport, due to frequent closures as a result of the ongoing civil war.  
4. Avoid all travel to the Houthi-controlled northern and western governorates due to the risk of attacks or kidnappings.  
5. Avoid travel to governorates with active frontlines between the Houthis and anti-Houthi forces, including Marib, al-Jawf, Bayda, Dali, Taiz and Hodeidah governorates due to the persistent risk of armed conflict.  
6. For those conducting essential travel to southern or eastern governorates, prepare contingency plans and awareness training for personnel due to the threat of militancy and clashes between armed militias. Remain cognizant that due to the multiple zones of influence, travelers are liable to encounter checkpoints manned by local forces, which could hinder travel.  
7. In southern governorates such as Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramout, refrain from discussing the southern separatist issue or expressing support for any of the political or military actors and their backers in Yemen as individuals are often targeted based on their political affiliations.  
8. Avoid the vicinity of socio-economic or anti-government protests in the southern governorates, including Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramout, as there is an increased potential for violence at  these demonstrations.  
9. Maintain vigilance near establishments linked to Western countries, including buildings of humanitarian organizations, due to the threat of attacks against such facilities as a result of anti-Western sentiments among certain segments of the populace.  
10. Foreigners, particularly Westerners, continuing to operate in Yemen are advised to maintain a low profile, exercise heightened vigilance, and avoid non-essentials locales frequented by foreigners that are liable to be targeted.  
11. To mitigate the risk of attacks or abductions in Yemen, ensure that places of stay are equipped with sufficient perimeter security details, frequently amend travel  and itinerary routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals. 
12. Remain cognizant that the ongoing armed conflict has significantly damaged health infrastructure throughout Yemen and limited the availability of food, electricity, water, medicine, and medical supplies. As a result, sufficient medical treatment is largely unavailable. It is advised to travel to any nearby Gulf countries for medical purposes.