• The May 24 vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack in Benghazi was likely conducted by the Islamic State (IS). The attack is indicative of the militant group’s efforts to intensify its activity in Libya at a time when the LNA remains preoccupied in hostilities in Derna. Thus, further such attacks will occur over the coming days and weeks.
• The Libyan National Army’s (LNA) seizure of Fattaih from the Derna Protection Force (DPF) is highly notable, given the area’s strategic significance for both sides. Over the coming days, the LNA will likely increase pressure on the DPF in areas located west and southwest of the city in an effort to completely gain control over the entire mountain terrain surrounding the city of Derna.
• The May 29 Libyan Air Force (LAF) airstrikes against Chadian militia groups near Sebha are notable as similar airstrikes have been relatively less common over the recent weeks. Given the LAF’s commitment to the March 15 “no-fly” zone over southern Libya’s airspace, further similar airstrikes against foreign militia groups in the south will occur over the coming weeks.
• Overall, the LNA will further intensify its artillery shelling and airstrikes against DPF positions over the coming days in order to eventually launch a ground offensive into the city of Derna. However, the LNA and LAF’s preoccupation in Derna will likely allow groups such as IS and armed militias to increase their activity in other parts of the country in the near term.

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported:

Benghazi

Derna

Fezzan Region

General Developments

• The May 24 attack in Benghazi was likely conducted by the Islamic State (IS), as it took place following Taraweeh prayers during the holy month of Ramadan, which in the past, has witnessed an uptick in militant activity across Libya and the Middle East and North Africa region. The attack is likely aimed at presenting Benghazi as unsecure, despite the LNA’s concerted efforts to clear it of jihadist elements. However, IS likely maintains sleeper cells dispersed throughout the city, which may have facilitated this attack. Moreover, recent weeks have witnessed an uptick in IS activity in Libya in general. For instance, on May 22, IS claimed a dual attack that targeted two LNA checkpoints at Gate 60/al-Qunan and in Awjila. This trend is indicative of the militant group’s efforts to intensify its activity in Libya, particularly at a time when the LNA remains preoccupied in hostilities in Derna. Thus, further such attacks will occur over the coming days and weeks.
• The LNA’s seizure of Fattaih from the DPF is highly notable, given the area’s strategic significance for both sides. By taking control of the hills of Fattaih, the LNA forces have essentially taken control over all vantage points overlooking Derna city from the southeast. This also provides the LNA control over the southeastern entrance to the city, which may allow LNA forces to possibly evacuate civilians from the city once the hostilities advance into the urban terrain. Over the coming days, the LNA will likely increase pressure on the DPF in areas located west and southwest of the city, namely al-Hamar and al-Hila, in an effort to completely gain control over the entire mountain terrain surrounding the city of Derna. This will further enable the LNA to advance to the second stage of its offensive, which will likely involve heavy artillery fire and airstrikes against DPF targets within Derna, before the former launches a ground offensive into the city. However, DPF militants will likely put up resistance, possibly in the form of asymmetric attacks against LNA forces, in order to hinder the latter from making further gains. This may include vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attacks, as witnessed on May 28 and May 29.

• Although the LAF has launched frequent airstrikes against Chadian militias in the Fezzan region over the past months, these airstrikes have been relatively less common over the recent weeks, thus rendering the latest development as notable. The most recent such airstrikes took place on March 31, when the LAF targeted a Chadian armed convoy in an unspecified area south-west of the Haruj mountains. This past downtick can likely be attributed the LAF’s recent preoccupation in hostilities in Derna, which have likely compelled them to redeploy their aircraft to the northeast. That said, the latest airstrikes, which were likely conducted by aircraft stationed at the nearby Brak al-Shati Airbase, demonstrate the LNA’s continued concerns regarding the threat posed by foreign militia groups in the largely tribal-controlled southern areas of the country, as well as their commitment to the March 15 “no-fly” zone over southern Libya’s airspace. Further similar LAF airstrikes against foreign militia groups in the south may occur over the coming weeks.

1. It is advised to defer all travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to a recent uptick in violence, threats against foreigners, and the risk of a broad deterioration of security conditions. We advise at this time that those remaining in Tripoli and Benghazi should initiate contingency and emergency evacuation plans due to deterioration in the security situation. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434 for itinerary and contingency support plans.
2. For those remaining in Tripoli, we advise to avoid nonessential travel to the outskirts of the city, particularly the Janzour and Tajoura neighborhoods, as well as to the Mitiga and Tripoli International Airports, given that these are focal points of ground clashes and airstrikes in the city.
3. Travel to Misrata and Tobruk should be for essential purposes only, while adhering to all security precautions regarding civil unrest and militancy. We advise against all travel to outlying areas of the country, due to the threat of militancy, kidnapping, and general lawlessness in such areas.
4. Avoid entering Libyan territorial waters in the area between Benghazi and al-Tamimi without prior authorization, as a “no-sail zone” is currently in effect in this area and several naval vessels had been intercepted or attacked due to not following proper procedures.
5. Those planning to conduct air travel to, from and inside Libya should avoid entering the area between Marsa al-Brega, Sirte and Sebha, as it was declared a no-fly zone by the Libyan National Army (LNA).
6. We further advise against all travel to Libya’s border areas at this time due to persistent violence and lawlessness in these regions.