This report reviews notable events this week in Sub-Saharan Africa. This includes ethnic violence in Cameroon’s Extreme North Region, France’s suspension of military cooperation with Ethiopia as the Tigray conflict intensifies, the first Ebola case recorded in Ivory Coast since 1994, the heightened political tensions as Sao Tome & Principe prepares for second round of presidential election, the violence in South Sudan stemming from intra-rebel conflict, and the opposition figure Hakainde Hichilema’s significant victory in Zambia’s recent presidential election.

Notable Developments

1. Reports from August 11 indicate that Arab Choa and Mousgoum communities clashed in Logone-Birni, Logone-et-Chari Department in the Extreme North Region on August 10 with nearly 40 killed. At least five were killed in another round of similar clashes near Kousseri on August 14.
2. Reports from August 15 indicate that President Paul Biya had deployed a delegation to resolve the intercommunal conflict and ordered to revive as well as establish new vigilante groups to fight militancy in the Extreme North Region.

ANALYSIS: These clashes between the herding and the fishing communities are notably the most significant intercommunal violence recently reported in Cameroon, particularly in the Extreme North Region. These also follow similar violence between Arab Choa and Kotoko communities in Makary, Logone-et-Chari Department, in late June. This is the latest flare-up of preexisting communal tensions amid a scarcity of resources due to climate change and entrenched militancy in the region, which have resulted in communities establishing themselves along water bodies such as the Logone River engaging in fishing and animal husbandry as farming became difficult. Despite the authorities’ reconciliation efforts, as tensions remain high such intercommunal violence may recur, particularly amid limited security presence, which is preoccupied with counter-militancy efforts. Amid a recent relative uptick in militancy, by reviving vigilantism, President Biya may seek to direct the residents toward a common enemy and consequently bolster counter-militancy efforts. However, the combination of heightened ethnic tensions and the persistent militant threat is poised to complicate the fragile security landscape even further.

Notable Developments

1. On August 12, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) announced an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). The OLA claimed the alliance was to overthrow the government militarily and both movements agreed to share battlefield information. The OLA also claimed it was in talks with other unspecified groups to form an anti-PM Abiy Ahmed coalition.
2. France suspended military cooperation with the Ethiopian National Defense forces (ENDF) until further notice on August 13 due to the ongoing Tigray conflict.

ANALYSIS: The alliance between the TPLF and the OLF is highly notable given their previous antagonistic relationship while the Tigrayans were in power, and underscores the depth of the discontent against PM Abiy. The sharing of battlefield information is likely to help in both groups’ fight against the government and stretch ENDF capabilities, already strained in Tigray Region, as they may have to further deploy to Oromia Region, weakening the government response against rebel groups in both areas. While the government is likely to crack down on the OLA and other rebel groups, given precedent, this is likely to have a limited impact on rebel activities. Rather, such a crackdown might antagonize rebels to conduct additional attacks against government forces, further deteriorating the security landscape. Finally, France likely found it untenable to continue cooperation with the ENDF given that it potentially used funds and training received to perpetrate alleged human rights abuses. Given that France was helping Ethiopia build a navy, this suspension might delay its formation and spur other partners such as the US to also suspend military assistance.

Notable Developments

1. On August 14, the Ministry of Health announced that a positive “isolated and imported” Ebola case was found in Abidjan. The patient traveled from Labe, Labe Region in Guinea to Abidjan by road on August 11 and was taken to the hospital on August 12.
2. The authorities have adopted measures such as heightened cross-border surveillance with Guinea, contact tracing, vaccinations, and social distancing measures to prevent the spread of the virus. On August 16, the World Health Organization (WHO) stated that contract tracing of suspected cases has been completed.

ANALYSIS: This is Ivory Coast’s first case of Ebola since 1994. The diagnosis of the case in Abidjan is significant given the city’s population density, with the potential for a rapid spread of the virus. This likely explains the authorities’ swift response in implementing multiple measures to prevent the virus’ spread. Given the absence of other cases in Ivory Coast and a recent outbreak in Guinea’s Nzerekore Region, it is likely that the patient carried the virus from Guinea. That said, there remains a distant potential for the patient to have contracted the virus in Ivory Coast, possibly in areas bordering Nzerekore. Regardless, given that the patient traveled by road, it remains possible that she came into contact with some persons not identified through WHO’s contact tracing. This suggests a possibility of further spread across Ivory Coast with additional suspected cases being identified as authorities attempt to contain the spread through enforced isolations and targeted vaccinations over the coming weeks.

Notable Developments

1. On August 11, the opposition party Independent Democratic Action (ADI) accused Defense Minister Oscar Sousa of plotting a coup d’etat against PM Jorge Bom Jesus, a fellow member of the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe-Social Democratic Party (MLSTP-PSD), and the ADI’s President Evaristo Carvalho. Democratic Convergence Party – Reflection Group (PCD-GR) presidential candidate Delfim Neves was also reportedly accused.
2. Jesus reportedly assumed the role of interim Defense Minister on August 14, citing Sousa’s alleged inability to perform his duties. Jesus also reportedly stated that the authorities will open an inquiry into alleged efforts to ‘subvert the constitutional order’.

ANALYSIS: This development reflects the heightened political tensions amid the ongoing presidential elections, with the second round slated to take place on August 29. While the ADI’s unsubstantiated allegations may have been intended to discredit the MLSTP-PSD and the PCD-GR, it is notable that Sousa should be accused of plotting to depose a fellow party member, indicating the possible development of factions within the MLSTP-PSD, with multiple party members running for president. With an absence of evidence to suggest that Jesus actively collaborated with the ADI to depose Sousa, it is possible that the PM sought to capitalize on the allegations to portray effective leadership and undermine an intra-party rival. Given the general paucity of information surrounding the situation, the allegations are unlikely to destabilize the imminent presidential election second round. Nonetheless, tensions are likely to remain elevated over the coming days and weeks.

Notable Developments

1. Reports indicate that Johnson Olony, the deputy of the dissenting Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition (SPLM-IO) faction led by Simon Gatwech, agreed to a ceasefire with First Vice President Riek Machar on August 12.
2. Reports indicate that the Gatwech-led faction claimed to have been targeted by SPLM-IO troops loyal to Machar in Magenis, Upper Nile State on August 16.

ANALYSIS: Gatwech and Olony had announced they removed Machar as the leader of the SPLM-IO on August 3, which culminated in clashes on August 7 said to be initiated by the Gatwech-led faction. The latest violence may have been retaliation by the Machar-aligned faction. However, this also suggests that either Machar does not genuinely intend to peacefully resolve the dispute within his party, or that he lacks control over his military leaders in Upper Nile. Gatwech had likely agreed to cease hostilities after President Salva Kiir called for the immediate unification of security forces on August 10, as Gatwech’s split was primarily based on his grievances over the lengthy process. Gatwech likely perceives Kiir’s support as crucial in order for him to gain influence or potentially recognition as an SPLM-IO leader in the context of the power-sharing agreement. This would have led him to accept a ceasefire as well. However, Gatwech’s ability to retain support within his ranks remains uncertain, with past reports of prominent SPLM-IO commanders defecting to Kiir. Such instability within Machar and Gatwech-aligned support bases suggests that prospects of intra-SPLM-IO reconciliation remain unlikely at this stage and the security situation is poised to remain volatile.

Notable Developments

1. On August 16, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) declared the United Party for National Development (UPND) candidate, Hakainde Hichilema, as the winner of the August 12 presidential elections with more than 2.8 million votes versus the outgoing President and Patriotic Front (PF) leader Edgar Lungu, who received 1.8 million votes.
2. Lungu conceded his defeat in a televised address on August 16, departing from his initial stance accusing the UPND of not allowing “free and fair” elections in their respective strongholds in North-Western, Western, and Southern provinces.

ANALYSIS: The election result is particularly noteworthy given the large victory margin between Lungu and Hichilema amid the tense pre-electoral period, which was marred by political violence and allegations against the PF for facilitating electoral manipulation and fraud. The result is also illustrative of the heightened public frustration against Lungu’s government and the state of the economy characterized by increasing government debt and spiraling inflation. Going forward, the announcement of results is likely to trigger official and spontaneous celebration events over the coming days until Hichilema’s inauguration, which is slated to take place on or after August 23. Such events are likely to take place outside respective party headquarters and other prominent public places in Lusaka and other parts of the country. Considering Lungu’s concession, the political transition period is likely to transpire relatively peacefully. However, as political tensions remain exceptionally high, isolated violent incidents may take place, particularly in politically sensitive provinces of Lusaka and Copperbelt, and PF strongholds.

• Madagascar – President Andry Rajoelina appointed a new and expanded cabinet including 32 ministers on August 16 after he dismissed all his cabinet ministers on August 11 without providing a reason for the decision. These developments follow arrests for an alleged failed coup attempt in July and was potentially done to establish Rajoelina’s authority over the cabinet and larger political landscape.

• South Africa – President Cyril Ramaphosa appeared before a judicial panel and admitted to knowing about corruption within the administration during his tenure as Vice-President to former President Jacob Zuma from 2009-2018. Meanwhile, Ramaphosa also confirmed the extension of the army deployment within the Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces to September 13.

• Sudan – The government confirmed its intent to hand over former President Omar al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on August 11. The government and ICC also signed a Memorandum of Understanding stipulating cooperation and exchange of information on all cases of those wanted by the court. The ICC also confirmed opening a permanent office in Khartoum.

• Uganda – The government has agreed to a US request to temporarily take in 2,000 refugees fleeing from Afghanistan due to the recent insurgent Taliban takeover of the country. The refugees will reside in Uganda for three months before their permanent relocation to another unspecified place.

• August 18 – A public sector strike is slated to be held across Ghana, where public workers denounce low rises in salary increments.
• August 21 – The “Wakit Tama” opposition coalition will protest against the Transitional Military Council in N’Djamena, Chad.
• August 23 – The trial over ‘Hidden Public Debt’ slated to begin in Maputo, Mozambique.
• August 24 – President-Elect Hakainde Hichilema will be inaugurated at a ceremony in Lusaka, Zambia.