Current Situation: 

• On May 10, the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) appointed four members to assume the council’s presidency on a rotational basis, with each member to remain in the role for five months.  
• Appointed members include Edgard Leblanc Fils, Louis Gerald Gilles, Leslie Voltaire, and Smith Augustin.  
• Separately on May 10, shooting, kidnappings, and closure of businesses were recorded in parts of Port-au-Prince (PauP) like Solino, Petition-Ville, and Gressier.  

Assessments & Forecast: The consensus-based move to appoint four presidents instead of one represents a shift in the traditional Haitian political system. This likely stems in response to the political strife within the TPC surrounding Edgard Leblanc Fils’s appointment as the interim PM on April 30. This may be intended to curb the influence of a single faction within the TPC, with Fils announcing to vote in alliance with three other members. Furthermore, concerns from the public and increased political pressure over TPC’s effectiveness will prevail through heightened levels of insecurity in PauP. This is buttressed by May 11 reports on civilian groups and police unions demanding the TPC to “arrest” Frantz Elbe, director of Police Nationale d’Haiti (PNH), following attacks against police stations in Gressier on May 10, and over Elbe’s alleged collusion with gangs. Separately, despite a period of deceleration observed since March 2023, an increase in inflation in February and March, reaching 3.1 and 4.7 percent, respectively is likely to worsen the economy, due to gang-violence triggering suspension of flights, paralysis of maritime activities, and bottlenecks in the market supply chains.  

Current Situation:  

• On May 8, nine corpses were discovered in Morelos, Zacatecas. This followed the discovery of nine bodies with narcomantas by Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS) threatening a rival crime organization in Fresnillo on May 7. 
• Following this, 1,000 security personnel were deployed to Zacatecas on May 9. In two separate security operations, authorities arrested 11 members of Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) in Guadalupe and Fresnillo municipalities, per May 13 reports. 

Assessments & Forecast: While CDS has been primarily held responsible for recent developments, the concurrent arrest of CJNG members demonstrates the fractured nature of organized crime presence in Zacatecas. With CDS, CJNG, and Cartel del Noreste vying for territorial control over cross-state drug trafficking from Zacatecas to Coahuila and Tamaulipas, levels of violence in the state have been relatively high, with 979 homicides recorded in 2023, albeit lower than the 1,400 in 2022. Further, the corpses were likely a state-wide response by criminal groups to assert territorial presence, particularly CDS, in retaliation to recent security operations, including the arrest of 26 CDS members across Zacatecas between May 5-7 and the death of CDS’ leader in Zacatecas, “El Gordo”, on May 4. This is further supported by criminals obstructing Carretera Federal 54 towards Saltillo city, Coahuila on May 7 and blockades with burning vehicles reported in Fresnillo, Trancoso, General Panfilo Natera, Sain Alto, Calera, and Villa Hidalgo areas on May 6-7. Security operations will continue to trigger confrontations between cartels and security personnel intermittently, in the form of narco-blockades and shootouts, in the near-term. 

Current Situation: 

• On May 8, Asamblea Nacional repealed Ley 840, which granted concessions to a Chinese businessman’s Hong Kong-based firm, to construct and manage the Nicaraguan Interoceanic Canal, linking the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. 
• The firm obtained the concession in 2013, but the project encountered operational and financial difficulties, with the company going bankrupt in April 2023. 

Assessments & Forecast: The cancellation of the contract was anticipated given the company’s perceived inability to finance the project, also evidenced by its removal from the Shanghai Stock exchange in 2021. To that end, the construction of the canal is unlikely to resume in the medium term, subsequently assuaging underlying concerns over land acquisition, forced displacement of the indigenous population, and environmental impact. Nevertheless, the project’s further delay will likely heighten the scrutiny of Chinese investments from civil society activists and opposition, regarding their financial feasibility and corruption allegations, with a Beijing-based engineering firm, involved in the reconstruction and expansion of Punta Huete International Airport, having been accused of delays and inefficient financing in previous projects. This is also likely amid the growing scope of Chinese investments in Nicaragua after both countries upgraded bilateral ties to strategic partnership on December 20, 2023. Such concerns over Beijing-backed projects, however, are highly unlikely to manifest as anti-government protests. This is particularly considering that civil unrest has notably declined since 2018, largely fearing severe crackdowns, evidenced by three farmer leaders being sentenced to over 150 years in 2019 for participating in anti-canal protests, accused of plotting a coup. 

Current Situation: 

• On May 8, an explosive attack at a high-voltage tower in Santa Rosa de Zancobamba disrupted power supply to mining units of the Pataz-based mining company in Maranon and Santa Maria, Sanchez Carrion province, La Libertad. 
• On May 10, security operations dismantled 45 illegal mining camps in Coigobamba and Shiracmaca villages, Huamachuco district, Sanchez Carrion.  

Assessments & Forecast: The attack was likely perpetrated by illegal mining groups, given that it comes after a similar detonation by illegal miners on the company’s facility in Vijus, Pataz that disabled two high-voltage towers and left one dead and 20 injured on April 5. These incidents highlight the latent threat posed by the presence of organized crime groups, in particular Venezuela-based transnational group Tren de Aragua (TdA) in La Libertad. The extent of TdA’s presence in the area is demonstrated by an attack by its members on the same company’s mine that left nine workers dead in December 2023, and the February 8 arrest of eight TdA affiliates for a range of crimes including kidnapping and extortion in Trujillo. Thus, the threat to mining infrastructure and personnel in the region persists despite an ongoing State of Emergency in Pataz and Trujillo, and the deployment of over 300 security personnel. The threat is further reiterated by the fact that attacks on the Pataz-based company’s facilities and nearby infrastructure have resulted in 17 deaths, and the destruction of 15 high-voltage towers, an electric substation, a transmission line and a hydroelectric power pipe from January 1, 2022 – May 8, 2024. 

Current Situation: 

• On May 14, President Joe Biden announced a tariff hike on Chinese imports citing “unfair trade practices concerning technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are threatening American businesses and workers.” 
• The tariffs for China-origin electric vehicles (EVs) will increase from 25 percent to 100 percent, for solar cells and semi-conductors from 25 percent to 50 percent, and for steel from 7.5 percent to 25 percent. 

Assessments & Forecast: Biden’s move aligns with increased concerns over Chinese dumping ahead of the November 5 presidential elections. This particularly comes amid rising operational costs and layoffs in the domestic automobile and steel sector, partly driven by alleged unfair trade stemming from low-cost Chinese products, being a major voter issue in key blue-collar swing states, including Michigan and Pennsylvania. Additionally, the measure is liable to accelerate Chinese production at overseas manufacturing units, surmounting cost-of-business barriers including tariffs, citing which former President Donald Trump pushed for the imposition of a 200 percent levy on Chinese vehicles manufactured in Mexico and Vietnam. Such proposals further highlight increasing attempts by both, Trump and Biden, in pushing protectionist trade polices with China. Tit-for-tat tariffs from Beijing remain likely, which may target more symbolic US-made agricultural goods, as witnessed in 2019. A drop in soybean and cotton stocks on May 14 supports the concern over Beijing’s retaliation. The likelihood of proportionate retaliatory tariffs on US-made technology or limiting exports of critical minerals is limited, as such a move would hinder Beijing’s effort to shore up domestic and foreign investor confidence in China’s economy.  

Current Situation:  

• On May 10, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 8N, permitting four US-based energy firms to conduct certain transactions with the Venezuelan state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A (PDVSA), necessary for wind-down operations, until November 15.  
• The firms listed are engaged in maintaining wells and drilling platforms in Venezuela.  
• The license prohibits drilling, processing, buying, selling, shipping crude oil or petroleum products. 

Assessments & Forecast: While the extended license prohibits the processing and shipping of Venezuelan crude, it likely aims to provide temporary relief to US-based firms dealing with PDVSA to maintain its assets and subsequently wind-down operations, thereby mitigating potential financial losses to the companies following the revocation of sanctions on April 17. However, these measures are unlikely to aid the Venezuelan oil sector, with exports already declining by 38 percent in April after the reinstatement of the sanctions forced firms to cancel overseas crude shipment contracts. Consequently, Caracas is likely to pursue intensified rapprochement efforts with perceived US adversaries, with President Nicolas Maduro’s son stating that Venezuela is open to paying its debt to China on May 9. On that note, Washington is also likely to continue granting exemptions to PDVSA’s joint venture partners, supported by OFAC permitting a France-based oil company to continue operating in Urdaneta Oeste field in Lake Maracaibo, per May 7 reports. These exemptions may be prompted by concerns over rising oil prices post-sanctions and conflicts in Ukraine and Middle East, and to prevent Caracas from further aligning with US adversaries.