Central African Republic SITUATION UPDATE: CPC accepts ceasefire agreement proposed by Great Lakes Regional leaders, refuses to withdraw from Bangui’s surroundings on February 2

Feb 2021

13:32 UTC

Executive Summary

The Coalition of Patriots for Change’s (CPC) willingness to accept the ceasefire agreement proposed by International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (CIRGL) leaders is highly notable given the group’s previous intentions to oust President Faustin-Archange Touadera and his government by force following the controversial December 2020 elections.
With details of the ceasefire agreement remaining ambiguous, such as its duration and the affected areas, and threats issued by the CPC leadership, it is possible that some CPC members will only adhere to the agreement partially as well as temporarily with the continued risk of CPC attacks in the near term.
Meanwhile, supporters of President Faustin-Archange Touadera held demonstrations in Bangui on January 30 and February 3 to protest against the talks with the CPC. Such civilian backlash is poised to complicate the situation and may recur if dialogue with CPC continues.
Meanwhile, the Coalition of the Democratic Opposition 2020 (COD2020) platform rejected the Constitutional Court’s ruling on February 1 to invalidate the legislative election results in some areas due to voting irregularities. While COD2020’s consequent move to boycott the remainder of the legislative election process is not surprising, this will impact opposition representation in the new Parliament and fuel further political tensions.

Security Incidents in CAR

Map #	Prefecture	Locale	Date	Brief Description
1	Ouaka	Bambari	January 21	Locals panic as Russian mercenaries arrive to reinforce government forces, one Fulani suspect arrested with weapons, two injured in shooting by FACA forces
2	Ouaka	Grimari	January 23	CPC rebels attack convoy escorted by MINUSCA forces
3	Mbomou	Bangassou	January 26	Large presence of CPC rebels in outskirts of town
4	Haut-Mboumou	Zemio	January 23	CPC rebels occupy sub-prefecture, seize motorcycles, vehicles from locals to prepare for attacks on nearby towns
5	Nana-Mambere	Foro	January 18	Two Cameroonian truck drivers killed in attack
6	Lobaye	Danga	January 24	FACA, Rwandan troops, Russian mercenaries approach village, CPC attempt ambush but are swiftly repelled
7	Lobaye	Boda	January 26	Security forces with support from Russian mercenaries regain control of town
8	Ombella-M’Poko	Liton	January 20	FACA, international partners conduct clearing operation in search for suspected CPC fighters
9	Ombella-M’Poko	Boali	January 26	FACA claims to kill 44 rebels attempting to block access to Bangui, three fighters taken captives

Other Developments

According to a statement issued by the Coalition of the Democratic Opposition 2020 (COD2020) on February 2, the opposition parties have formally withdrawn from the electoral process following the Constitutional Court’s (CC) validation of the first round of legislative elections on February 1.
The COD2020 claims that the failure of the CC to address appeals regarding electoral irregularities, violence, and discrimination against opposition candidates by 346 legislative aspirants proves that there was extensive mismanagement of the December 2020 legislative elections. The parties further pledged to boycott the second round of legislative elections and upcoming by-elections.
This follows the CC’s decision to invalidate the legislative election results in 13 constituencies on February 1 over voting irregularities such as the manipulation of ballot boxes and violence at polling stations. The government is slated to hold a second round of elections in 47 constituencies and by-elections in 71 others ahead of the termination of the National Assembly mandate on May 2.
Reports citing statements by Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) spokesperson Abakar Sabome on February 2 indicate that the group has accepted calls for an immediate ceasefire by leaders of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (CIRGL) and Chad, but claims that CPC elements have already infiltrated Bangui and its surrounding areas and refuse to withdraw from their positions.
Additionally, the group has called for clarification on the terms of the ceasefire including its duration, and has threatened to retaliate against the government in a “very severe way” should Central African Armed Forces (FACA) troops breach the ceasefire agreement. As of writing, the government has yet to release an official statement on the ceasefire and it remains unclear if FACA troops are bound to the agreement.
Separate sources from February 2 indicate that FACA troops with support from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA) conducted clearing operations targeting CPC rebels in Bangui’s unspecified northern and southern neighborhoods, killing and wounding several fighters.
Meanwhile, supporters of President Faustin-Archange Touadera reportedly held demonstrations in Bangui on January 30 and February 3 to protest against the prospect of the government and regional leaders holding talks with the CPC. Protest organizers have also issued a petition to the government in this regard.
Separate reports indicate that the Patriotic Movement for the CAR (MPC) and the Union for Peace in the CAR (UPC) released a joint statement on January 30, in which both armed groups acknowledged Touadera’s electoral victory, denounced the CPC and former President Francois Bozize, and reaffirmed their participation in the 2019 Khartoum Peace Agreement.

Assessments & Forecast

The CPC’s willingness to accept the ceasefire agreement proposed by CIRGL leaders is notable given the group’s previous intentions to oust Touadera and his government by force following the controversial December 2020 elections. In this context, the MPC and UPC withdrawal from the CPC is noteworthy with both the groups likely seeking to retain status as the state’s partners and associated benefits including potential recognition of these groups’ territorial control across the country.
However, it appears that this may have got the CPC to acknowledge its increased political and battlefield limitations following the departure of these major armed groups despite other armed groups like the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) recently joining the CPC. Furthermore, CPC’s acceptance of the ceasefire was likely additionally motivated by FACA and its international partners’ recently ramped up operations throughout Bangui and its surroundings to clear CPC rebels from the area. The CPC is probably tempted to pursue dialogue with the government to avoid further territorial losses and to improve its chance of securing some political concessions.
Within this context, security forces successfully dislodged the CPC from several areas surrounding Bangui and other strategic locations such as Boda, Lobaye Prefecture in recent days. FORECAST: Despite the CPC’s weakened position, with details of the ceasefire agreement remaining ambiguous, particularly regarding its duration and the affected areas, it’s possible that some CPC members will not adhere to the agreement. In light of the CPC leadership already rejecting requirements for CPC fighters to withdraw from in and around Bangui, it seems unlikely that the ceasefire will have much of an impact on the presence of hostile rebel forces in and around the capital. Thus, CPC’s adherence to the ceasefire can be expected to be only partial and temporary in nature with the continued potential of CPC attacks taking place against security forces as well as civilians in the near term. Additionally, given that security clearing operations took place in Bangui on February 2 despite the ceasefire, CPC could consider it as a breach of the agreement by the state and motivate the rebels to remain engaged in armed campaigns against the government.
FORECAST: That said, given the CPC’s claims that its forces remain in and around Bangui, it’s possible that the city will continue to experience extensive food and supply shortages. While the government has implemented a temporary state of emergency to facilitate its military and logistical response, the CPC’s presence and effort to isolate Bangui still threatens to disrupt the flow of supplies to civilians, military, and international forces deployed throughout the city. Furthermore, in light of the recent protests in Bangui by President Touadera’s supporters, any further attempts by the government or its regional partners to negotiate a settlement with the CPC could result in public backlash or civil unrest.
Meanwhile, the COD2020 platform’s rejection of the CC’s ruling on the legislative election results and move to boycott the remainder of the legislative election process is not surprising as the group previously rejected the outcome of the presidential elections on similar grounds. Although the CC dismissed the majority of appeals filed over extensive irregularities observed during the legislative polls, that the court annulled the results in 13 constituencies illustrates that the government is conscious of the impact of electoral irregularities on the credibility of the polls in some areas.
FORECAST: In light of the court’s ruling, this could raise further backlash over the government’s dismissal of irregularity claims in other constituencies and during the presidential elections, held on the same day. Given the challenges, irregularities, and violence faced during the first round of presidential and legislative elections, it’s clear that the COD2020 has little confidence in the government’s ability to hold secure and credible re-run elections. In this context, the COD2020 is likely hoping that by boycotting the remainder of the electoral process, the parties can draw further international attention and scrutiny over the handling and legitimacy of the country’s recent polls. However, a boycott is likely to result in minimal opposition representation in the new government and further political tensions.

Recommendations

Travel to Bangui should be restricted to essential purposes only given the volatile security situation, while avoiding all travel to Bangui’s PK5 area.
Avoid all travel to outlying areas of CAR given the ongoing armed conflict and high levels of sectarian violence and criminality.

Extreme

Nationwide

Extreme

Credible

Executive Summary

The Coalition of Patriots for Change’s (CPC) willingness to accept the ceasefire agreement proposed by International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (CIRGL) leaders is highly notable given the group’s previous intentions to oust President Faustin-Archange Touadera and his government by force following the controversial December 2020 elections.
With details of the ceasefire agreement remaining ambiguous, such as its duration and the affected areas, and threats issued by the CPC leadership, it is possible that some CPC members will only adhere to the agreement partially as well as temporarily with the continued risk of CPC attacks in the near term.
Meanwhile, supporters of President Faustin-Archange Touadera held demonstrations in Bangui on January 30 and February 3 to protest against the talks with the CPC. Such civilian backlash is poised to complicate the situation and may recur if dialogue with CPC continues.
Meanwhile, the Coalition of the Democratic Opposition 2020 (COD2020) platform rejected the Constitutional Court’s ruling on February 1 to invalidate the legislative election results in some areas due to voting irregularities. While COD2020’s consequent move to boycott the remainder of the legislative election process is not surprising, this will impact opposition representation in the new Parliament and fuel further political tensions.

Security Incidents in CAR

Map #	Prefecture	Locale	Date	Brief Description
1	Ouaka	Bambari	January 21	Locals panic as Russian mercenaries arrive to reinforce government forces, one Fulani suspect arrested with weapons, two injured in shooting by FACA forces
2	Ouaka	Grimari	January 23	CPC rebels attack convoy escorted by MINUSCA forces
3	Mbomou	Bangassou	January 26	Large presence of CPC rebels in outskirts of town
4	Haut-Mboumou	Zemio	January 23	CPC rebels occupy sub-prefecture, seize motorcycles, vehicles from locals to prepare for attacks on nearby towns
5	Nana-Mambere	Foro	January 18	Two Cameroonian truck drivers killed in attack
6	Lobaye	Danga	January 24	FACA, Rwandan troops, Russian mercenaries approach village, CPC attempt ambush but are swiftly repelled
7	Lobaye	Boda	January 26	Security forces with support from Russian mercenaries regain control of town
8	Ombella-M’Poko	Liton	January 20	FACA, international partners conduct clearing operation in search for suspected CPC fighters
9	Ombella-M’Poko	Boali	January 26	FACA claims to kill 44 rebels attempting to block access to Bangui, three fighters taken captives

Other Developments

According to a statement issued by the Coalition of the Democratic Opposition 2020 (COD2020) on February 2, the opposition parties have formally withdrawn from the electoral process following the Constitutional Court’s (CC) validation of the first round of legislative elections on February 1.
The COD2020 claims that the failure of the CC to address appeals regarding electoral irregularities, violence, and discrimination against opposition candidates by 346 legislative aspirants proves that there was extensive mismanagement of the December 2020 legislative elections. The parties further pledged to boycott the second round of legislative elections and upcoming by-elections.
This follows the CC’s decision to invalidate the legislative election results in 13 constituencies on February 1 over voting irregularities such as the manipulation of ballot boxes and violence at polling stations. The government is slated to hold a second round of elections in 47 constituencies and by-elections in 71 others ahead of the termination of the National Assembly mandate on May 2.
Reports citing statements by Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) spokesperson Abakar Sabome on February 2 indicate that the group has accepted calls for an immediate ceasefire by leaders of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (CIRGL) and Chad, but claims that CPC elements have already infiltrated Bangui and its surrounding areas and refuse to withdraw from their positions.
Additionally, the group has called for clarification on the terms of the ceasefire including its duration, and has threatened to retaliate against the government in a “very severe way” should Central African Armed Forces (FACA) troops breach the ceasefire agreement. As of writing, the government has yet to release an official statement on the ceasefire and it remains unclear if FACA troops are bound to the agreement.
Separate sources from February 2 indicate that FACA troops with support from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA) conducted clearing operations targeting CPC rebels in Bangui’s unspecified northern and southern neighborhoods, killing and wounding several fighters.
Meanwhile, supporters of President Faustin-Archange Touadera reportedly held demonstrations in Bangui on January 30 and February 3 to protest against the prospect of the government and regional leaders holding talks with the CPC. Protest organizers have also issued a petition to the government in this regard.
Separate reports indicate that the Patriotic Movement for the CAR (MPC) and the Union for Peace in the CAR (UPC) released a joint statement on January 30, in which both armed groups acknowledged Touadera’s electoral victory, denounced the CPC and former President Francois Bozize, and reaffirmed their participation in the 2019 Khartoum Peace Agreement.

Assessments & Forecast

The CPC’s willingness to accept the ceasefire agreement proposed by CIRGL leaders is notable given the group’s previous intentions to oust Touadera and his government by force following the controversial December 2020 elections. In this context, the MPC and UPC withdrawal from the CPC is noteworthy with both the groups likely seeking to retain status as the state’s partners and associated benefits including potential recognition of these groups’ territorial control across the country.
However, it appears that this may have got the CPC to acknowledge its increased political and battlefield limitations following the departure of these major armed groups despite other armed groups like the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) recently joining the CPC. Furthermore, CPC’s acceptance of the ceasefire was likely additionally motivated by FACA and its international partners’ recently ramped up operations throughout Bangui and its surroundings to clear CPC rebels from the area. The CPC is probably tempted to pursue dialogue with the government to avoid further territorial losses and to improve its chance of securing some political concessions.
Within this context, security forces successfully dislodged the CPC from several areas surrounding Bangui and other strategic locations such as Boda, Lobaye Prefecture in recent days. FORECAST: Despite the CPC’s weakened position, with details of the ceasefire agreement remaining ambiguous, particularly regarding its duration and the affected areas, it’s possible that some CPC members will not adhere to the agreement. In light of the CPC leadership already rejecting requirements for CPC fighters to withdraw from in and around Bangui, it seems unlikely that the ceasefire will have much of an impact on the presence of hostile rebel forces in and around the capital. Thus, CPC’s adherence to the ceasefire can be expected to be only partial and temporary in nature with the continued potential of CPC attacks taking place against security forces as well as civilians in the near term. Additionally, given that security clearing operations took place in Bangui on February 2 despite the ceasefire, CPC could consider it as a breach of the agreement by the state and motivate the rebels to remain engaged in armed campaigns against the government.
FORECAST: That said, given the CPC’s claims that its forces remain in and around Bangui, it’s possible that the city will continue to experience extensive food and supply shortages. While the government has implemented a temporary state of emergency to facilitate its military and logistical response, the CPC’s presence and effort to isolate Bangui still threatens to disrupt the flow of supplies to civilians, military, and international forces deployed throughout the city. Furthermore, in light of the recent protests in Bangui by President Touadera’s supporters, any further attempts by the government or its regional partners to negotiate a settlement with the CPC could result in public backlash or civil unrest.
Meanwhile, the COD2020 platform’s rejection of the CC’s ruling on the legislative election results and move to boycott the remainder of the legislative election process is not surprising as the group previously rejected the outcome of the presidential elections on similar grounds. Although the CC dismissed the majority of appeals filed over extensive irregularities observed during the legislative polls, that the court annulled the results in 13 constituencies illustrates that the government is conscious of the impact of electoral irregularities on the credibility of the polls in some areas.
FORECAST: In light of the court’s ruling, this could raise further backlash over the government’s dismissal of irregularity claims in other constituencies and during the presidential elections, held on the same day. Given the challenges, irregularities, and violence faced during the first round of presidential and legislative elections, it’s clear that the COD2020 has little confidence in the government’s ability to hold secure and credible re-run elections. In this context, the COD2020 is likely hoping that by boycotting the remainder of the electoral process, the parties can draw further international attention and scrutiny over the handling and legitimacy of the country’s recent polls. However, a boycott is likely to result in minimal opposition representation in the new government and further political tensions.

Recommendations

Travel to Bangui should be restricted to essential purposes only given the volatile security situation, while avoiding all travel to Bangui’s PK5 area.
Avoid all travel to outlying areas of CAR given the ongoing armed conflict and high levels of sectarian violence and criminality.

Extreme

Nationwide

Extreme

Credible

Central African Republic SITUATION UPDATE: CPC accepts ceasefire agreement proposed by Great Lakes Regional leaders, refuses to withdraw from Bangui’s surroundings on February 2

Executive Summary

Security Incidents in CAR

Other Developments

Assessments & Forecast

Recommendations

Executive Summary

Security Incidents in CAR

Other Developments

Assessments & Forecast

Recommendations

Related Reports

Related Reports

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