MAX Security is sending an in-depth update on the Israel-Hamas war and the impact on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The frequency of the report is determined in accordance with the developments in the region. At the current time, the report will be issued every other day or in the event of a notable trigger. The pace of reporting will continue to be adjusted as the war evolves into the next phases.  

• On February 25, Israel’s Defense Minister stated that Israel would continue to target Hezbollah in Lebanon irrespective of a truce deal in Gaza. This signals a more proactive approach by the IDF aimed at strategically removing the threat posed in the north.  
• On February 26, the IDF confirmed the downing of an Israeli UAV by a Hezbollah missile. This highlights the group’s ability to identify and intercept IDF aerial devices. 
• As part of this incident, the IDF fired an interceptor near northern Israel’s Afula. This potentially intercepted a Hezbollah SAM and may indicate the group’s possession of sophisticated systems. 
• On February 24, Israel Police deployed riot dispersal measures during an anti-government protest in Tel Aviv. This is the first recorded use of such measures during a protest since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war, highlighting political tensions. 

Northern Israel 

• During the morning hours of February 26, Israel’s air defense systems intercepted a surface-to-air missile from Lebanon in northern Israel’s Alon Tavor, which is located near Afula. Afula is located about 48-50 km from the Israel-Lebanon border.  
• The IDF subsequently confirmed that a surface-to-air missile launched at a remotely manned IDF drone was intercepted using the David Sling air defense system. It further stated that a warning siren for rocket and missile fire was activated in the Alon Tavor area following the launch of the interceptor.  
• It added that a second missile was later launched at the IDF drone, which hit the aircraft, leading it to fall within Lebanese territory.
• During the early afternoon hours of February 26, the IDF announced that it was conducting airstrikes “deep” into Lebanese territory and targeted Hezbollah’s air defense systems in Beqaa. The IDF stated this to be retaliation for the surface-to-air missile launched earlier by Hezbollah. An unconfirmed report indicated that at least two Hezbollah members were killed in these strikes near Baalbek.  
• During the early morning hours of February 26, Color Red sirens were sounded in Israel’s Majdal Shams and northern Golan areas due to suspicions of unrecognized aircraft. 
• The IDF attacked a terrorist squad and two military facilities linked to Hezbollah in Lebanon’s Blida on February 25. 
• On the same day, projectiles from Lebanon were detected in Israel’s Galilee area, Margaliot, Har Dov, Kiryat Shmona, Menara and Malkia. The IDF retaliated by attacking the sources of launches. 
• On February 25, the mayor of Kiryat Shmona reiterated his urge for residents of the city to evacuate from the city in light of persistent Hezbollah attacks. 

Gaza Strip  

• On February 26, the IDF stated that it eliminated about 30 terrorists in its operations in northern Gaza’s Zeitoun. Additionally, terrorist squads in Khan Younis, including one terrorist possessing an RPG launcher, were also eliminated. 
• The IDF stated on February 25 that five soldiers, three in southern Gaza and two in northern Gaza, had been wounded in combat and have subsequently been evacuated to Israel.   
• On February 26, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) in Israel announced that the IDF presented a plan to the War Cabinet for evacuating civilians from areas of fighting in the Gaza Strip. A plan to provide humanitarian assistance in the Gaza Strip which prevented “looting” that took place in northern Gaza was also approved. 

West Bank  

• According to reports from February 26, Muhammad Ashteyeh, the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA) reportedly submitted his government’s resignation to the Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the PA.  
• On February 26, the IDF stated that it arrested 22 individuals in the West Bank’s Nablus and Kfar Qallil and confiscated terrorist funds worth 100,000 Israeli Shekels (NIS). Counter-militancy operations were also conducted in Silwad, Deir Ammar and Beit Ummer where ten individuals were arrested.
   

Red Sea  

• On February 26, the CENTCOM stated that it shot down two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the Red Sea on February 24. A third UAV crashed due to in-flight failure.  

General Developments 

• On February 25, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated that Israel would increase strikes on Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, even in case of a temporary ceasefire with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 
• According to February 25 reports, an Israeli delegation is set to arrive in Qatar soon to engage in negotiations for a truce deal in Gaza.  
• A video circulated on social media depicts a mounted policeman hitting a protester during the February 24 anti-government protest in Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Street. According to February 25 reports, the Israel Police will investigate the incident. The protest also recorded the use of water cannons by security forces to disperse the protesters.  

Home Front Command Guidelines   

• The IDF’s Home Front Command (HFC) released its updated guidelines on February 25, which will be in place until February 27 at 18:00. The updated guidelines can be found in the picture below. 

Gallant’s statement on Israel’s determination to continue attacks on Hezbollah points to a change of course 

1. Israel’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s statement comes amid a continued exchange of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in recent days. This includes Israeli airstrikes deeper into Lebanese territory as part of its efforts to disrupt Hezbollah’s operational capacity by targeting assets and more senior personnel in the Iran-backed group’s ranks. Gallant’s statement indicates that Israel’s engagement with Hezbollah is likely to continue independently of whether the group continues its attacks on Israel in the event of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. This differs from the previous ceasefire and signals that Israel is somewhat changing course from its previous posture of retaliating against Hezbollah attacks toward a more offensive and proactive stance. This is a result of Israel’s resolve to strategically curb threats pertaining to Hezbollah’s presence and operational capacity rather than merely limiting its current activity and attacks that are launched in support of Hamas. However, Israel remains unlikely to engage in a full-scale war as part of this approach, given its recent rhetoric and actions. 
2. FORECAST: Given the likely intent to refrain from a full-scale war at the current juncture, the IDF will continue to strike Hezbollah targets, including in territory beyond southern Lebanon; it will seek to contain its operations to precision and retaliatory strikes only. In turn, this will prompt Hezbollah to demonstrate the capabilities it could deploy (see assessment below) in the event of a full-scale war. This is likely through occasional attacks deeper into Israel’s territory and against more strategic targets. Regardless, as assessed previously, owing to operational capacity and caution against reducing its domestic political support within Lebanon, Hezbollah is unlikely to seek to trigger a full-scale war with Israel. Overall, Gallant’s statement reiterates Israel’s goal of significantly degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities to facilitate the return of Israel’s residents to its border. Therefore, regardless of the ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, the exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah are likely to persist. This will maintain the potential for a broader escalation, despite its current low probability.  

IDF’s confirmation of the downing of Israeli UAV in Lebanese airspace highlights Hezbollah’s aerial capabilities, may point to more sophisticated systems 

1. The IDF confirmed on February 26 that the David’s Sling air defense system intercepted a surface-to-air missile (SAM) that was fired towards an Israeli aircraft in Lebanese airspace. This was followed by a secondary unspecified missile that hit an IDF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and downed the device. The two incidents potentially provide some insights into the capabilities of the two parties. In terms of the downing of the UAV in Lebanon, claimed by Hezbollah and confirmed by the IDF, this illustrates the Iran-backed group’s ability to identify and down Israeli UAVs in its territory. This is likely made possible by the UAV’s low and slow flight path, which is more visible, noisier, and less maneuverable than a manned aircraft. The UAV could, therefore, have been targeted by Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) that pose a threat to such low-flying aircraft. This capability is also difficult to preemptively target as Hezbollah fighters can emerge from their positions to fire them at short notice.  
2. The second scenario, which is partially suggested by the interception in the Afula area in northern Israel, is that Hezbollah utilized a more sophisticated SAM system to down the aircraft. The first attack that missed its target may have continued its flight course towards northern Israel due to its ballistic energy and was assessed to have impacted around 50km from the border. The IDF has not confirmed this as the source of the siren, which it stated was due to the launch of the interceptor. However, if confirmed, this would suggest that Hezbollah possesses more sophisticated SAM systems that could potentially pose a threat to IAF manned aircraft as well as UAVs. That said, it is currently unclear why Hezbollah would seek to expose such a capability to target a UAV at the current low level of hostilities unless there was a special target that the UAV was hovering over or nearby. Alternatively, Hezbollah may have aimed to project an operational achievement given its recent personnel losses. In addition, Hezbollah and Iran have an interest in obtaining Israeli technology for intelligence and potential reverse engineering purposes. In any case, it would also point to a potential intelligence gap for Israel if it failed to identify the launch of the missile and the deployment of the systems to areas near the border. FORECAST: The IDF will likely investigate this further to understand the nature of the threat and, if confirmed, alter its operations accordingly. Nevertheless, Israel will likely retain overall aerial supremacy and relative freedom of operation over Lebanon’s airspace.  

Unrest, intensified riot dispersal measures recorded during anti-government protest in Tel Aviv highlights political tensions in country 

1. The latest deployment of riot dispersal measures, including the use of water cannons by the police, is notable. This is because it is the first recorded use of such measures during an anti-government protest since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. This, therefore, marks an escalation in the police’s handling of anti-government protesters. It comes as anti-government protests have both grown in momentum, as highlighted by increased turnouts, and become increasingly political, with demonstrators calling for elections to lead the country forward. The rhetoric and unrest at recent protests showcase the extent of anti-government grievances among activists. Combined, these factors indicate a return to pre-war protest trends wherein the police would periodically deploy riot control measures against those protesting the government’s judicial overhaul.  
2. The Israel Police stated the protest on Kaplan Street was illegal and was held at the same time as an approved protest at the nearby Hostages Square. Despite this claim and the reported probe, activists and anti-government groups are likely to perceive this violence as evidence of the politicization of the Israel Police. This is especially in light of the police’s inclusion under the Ministry of National Security, headed by far-right and controversial Minister Itamar Ben Gvir. This further highlights the prevalent political tensions in the country. FORECAST: The recent clashes between protesters and security forces are liable to heighten protesters’ grievances and galvanize additional protesters who may have refrained from taking to the street. This will, therefore, prompt an increased turnout at weekly anti-government protests in Tel Aviv. Over the coming weeks, the Israel Police will likely continue deploying riot-control measures against protesters, especially if they are perceived as disobeying police instructions. 

Israel 

Travel  

1. Due to the continued conflict in the Gaza Strip and ongoing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, and despite the significantly reduced threat, consider the necessity of travel to Israel at the current time.   
2. Those operating or residing within Israel are advised to continuously prepare, update, and review contingency plans due to the volatile security situation.  
3. Avoid travel to within ten km (six miles) of the Gaza Strip due to the continued threat of rocket and mortar attacks as well as the minimal time to reach bomb shelters. Those operating or residing in this area are advised to minimize nonessential outdoor movement and remain close to bomb shelters/safe rooms.  
4. Avoid travel to within ten km of the Lebanese and Syrian borders. Those operating or residing in this area are advised to minimize nonessential outdoor movement and remain close to bomb shelters/safe rooms.  
5. Remain cognizant of the potential for localized protests throughout the country due to high political tensions, especially along Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv. Albeit currently less likely, unrest is possible in Jerusalem, mixed Jewish-Arab locales, such as Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, Ramla, and Akko, as well as Arab-populated cities and towns.  
6. Avoid all travel to the West Bank and East Jerusalem due to the risk of armed clashes and militant attacks.  
7. Those operating or residing throughout Israel, particularly in major cities and crowded areas, are advised to maintain vigilance due to the currently heightened threat of terrorist attacks. 

General  

1. Adhere to all safety precautions regarding early warning sirens for incoming rockets. Rocket sirens may be heard throughout the country.   
2. Ensure that working environments are within reach of bomb shelters/safe rooms.   
3. When a Color Red siren is sounded: if a designated shelter exists, immediately go there. If not, go to a room with as few external walls, windows, and openings as possible, sit on the floor below the window line, and near an internal wall.    
4. In an open area, lay down on the ground and cover your head with your hands.   
5. When driving, safely pull over and follow the above instructions.  
6. Remain cognizant of the circulation of rumors and fake news at the current time on social media and messaging platforms. Adhere only to official announcements by authorities.  
7. Avoid political conversations or criticism of the government or the IDF to avoid unpleasant interactions given the high tensions in Israeli society. Similarly, avoid making pro-Palestinian statements in public, which could lead to aggressive interactions.  
8. MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities in Israel, including contingency consultation and planning. Contact us at [email protected] or +44 20-3540-0434. 

Lebanon  

1. It is advised to defer all travel to Lebanon until further notice due to the continued cross-border hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border and the potential for a broader escalation.  
2. Those operating or residing in Lebanon are advised to continue to avoid travel to within 20km of the border with Israel due to ongoing hostilities. 

MENA Maritime Zones (when relevant) 

1. Remain apprised of UKMTO and US DOT Maritime Administration-issued notices, as well as being aware of NATO Shipping Center alerts.  
2. For essential Red Sea travel, review ownership and management history of ships for past links to the US, UK and Israel.  
3. Remain vigilant for suspicious objects, actors, possible threats at sea. 
4. Ensure crewmembers’ security awareness, contingency plans, and ability to respond to incidents at sea. 
5. Owners and operators of vessels potentially involved in legal cases relating to the US sanctions regimes over Iran are advised to conduct risk assessments before traveling near Iranian waters, given the risk of detention by Iranian authorities.