Current Situation – Madagascar is slated to hold local elections with 11.6 million registered voters eligible to cast votes. Voters will elect 1,695 mayors for the same number of communes, with 5,389 applicants contesting for these positions. In Antananarivo, seven candidates are running, including Harilala Ramanantsoa of the ruling “All Together With Andry Rajoelina” (IRMAR) coalition who will face the main opposition candidate Tojo Ravalomanana, son of the former president Marc Ravalomanana, of the Firaisankina coalition.

Assessments & Forecast – These elections come amid heightened political tensions, with the opposition accusing the ruling IRMAR of suppressing the opposition to secure victory through manipulative tactics like elevated candidate registration fees and barring the main opposition figure Marc Ravalomanana from contesting. In Antananarivo, Tojo Ravalomanana, backed by his father’s supporters, is the main challenger to IRMAR and is expected to lead in the race. In other municipalities, the ruling coalition is likely to maintain a slight edge. A heavy security presence, including roadblocks and curfews, is expected nationwide near polling stations, especially in Antananarivo. Tensions could escalate, with a potential for protests and unrest on election day.

Recommendations – Those operating in Madagascar on December 11 and over the coming days and weeks are advised to avoid the vicinity of all political gatherings and election-related facilities due to the heightened political tensions and the potential for unrest.

Current situation – Sources indicate that on December 5, a gold and diamond collector, known as Sallahdine, was apprehended by Russian private military contractors (PMC) who stole 800,000 CFA (approximately 1,300 USD). The Russian PMCs further demanded that Sallahdine relinquish his gold and diamonds, which were not on his person. Sallahdine was then executed, his body dressed in military trousers, and his head placed on his lap.

Assessments & Forecast – This comes amid repeated claims of Russian PMC engaging in extrajudicial killings against locals. Considering Sallahdine’s profession, he was likely targeted for his engagement in the gold and diamond sector, primarily given PMC’s mining interest. It highlights the PMC’s perceived monopoly over resources in CAR due to an alleged agreement with the government for control over mines in exchange for security assistance. That said, the extreme measures used in the killing, alongside the circulation of images of the incident, also suggest the PMC’s efforts to intimidate locals and establish their dominance in mining areas. Given the precedent, the authorities are unlikely to respond to the incident, with similar instances of PMC’s extrajudicial killings likely recurring.

Current Situation – Reports indicate that the army and March 23 Movement (M23) rebels clashed near Kaseghe between December 6-9. The army reportedly recaptured areas on the outskirts of Kaseghe and Loufo. Fighting was reported in Vulamba, Miriki, Mighobwe, Kibaku, and Matembe with the army reportedly regaining control of western Matembe on December 7. Clashes were also reported near Sake, Masisi Territory, North Kivu on December 7-8. 

Assessments & Forecast – The clashes highlight the continued intensification of clashes within Lubero Territory after the Angola-led mediation efforts between DRC and Rwanda perceivably failed to yield any significant results. The army’s regaining of control of Luofo, Matembe, and the outskirts of Kasegbe is notable and highlights its efforts to obstruct potential M23 northward advancement from Kanyabonga to strategically important towns of Butembo and Beni all of which lie along the RN2 road. The fighting in Sake forms part of sporadically recurring clashes indicating M23’s continued presence in areas around strategic towns in Masisi and Rutshuru territories they previously threatened. Intensified clashes will likely persist in Lubero Territory with continued regional mediation efforts unlikely to significantly impact the ongoing conflict.

Current Situation – Reports indicate that the police attributed the gunfire near Megenagna in Addis Ababa on December 8 to “celebratory gestures” by Jaal Senay Negasa-led Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) members. Pro-Amhara and pro-Oromo sources claimed that the gunfire caused injuries and represented a reprisal by the group.

Assessments & Forecast – This follows elevated concerns after reports of gunfire in the capital. The pro-Amhara and pro-Oromo sources’ claims of reprisal by the OLA’s Negasa after a peace agreement with the government on December 1 are likely intended to showcase the ineffectiveness of such agreements. However, given that no independent sources verified the claims, they are likely exaggerated. This aligns with the risk of disinformation in Ethiopia, which armed groups try to capitalize on to undermine the government, as evidenced by similarly exaggerated claims of armed groups’ operational capabilities in Addis Ababa. The police’s clarification is likely intended to tackle such disinformation and showcase control over the security situation. However, the “celebratory fire” still highlights certain operational failures to prevent “disarmed” rebels from disrupting the peace. Overall, the security situation in Addis Ababa will likely remain unchanged.

Current Situation – In an official press conference, the Election Commission (EC) confirmed that the New Patriotic Party (NPP) candidate Mahamudu Bawumia secured 41 percent of the total votes. The voter turnout was recorded at 60.9 percent. A National Democratic Congress (NDC) candidate won the Dome Kwabenya parliamentary seat in the Greater Accra Region. Meanwhile, the Damongo Municipal EC office was reportedly set ablaze by unidentified youth due to delays in declaring electoral results. 

Assessments & Forecast – This follows Bawumia’s prompt concession of defeat to Mahama before the publication of the December 7 electoral results. Mahama’s victory highlights the extent of public support for his candidacy and his party, primarily driven by heightened frustrations against NPP. This also explains NDC’s victory at Dome Kwabenya constituency, which had historically been an NPP stronghold. The voter turnout in the elections is nearly 20 percent less compared to the 2020 elections and may have resulted from voter disillusionment. Meanwhile, the attack in Damongo municipality aligns with the trend of small-scale violence during the elections. With EC’s confirmation, Mahama will likely proceed to form his government in the coming days.

Current Situation – Reports indicate that Deputy President (DP) Kithure Kindiki stated that a court injunction blocking appointments of commissioners to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) is preventing the government from moving forward with the reconstitution process. Kindiki urged the parties involved to consider an out-of-court settlement to expedite IEBC’s formation, stating it would facilitate the holding of by-elections in select constituencies. 

Assessments & Forecast – This comes as the IEBC’s reconstitution remains blocked by an October injunction after an appeal over the alleged lack of representation of people with disabilities in the then-proposed selection panel that would appoint new IEBC commissioners. Kindiki’s statements are likely intended to hedge against any criticism of the government for stalling in the process of the IEBC’s reconstitution, which the opposition may claim is intended to prevent by-elections in constituencies that the ruling coalition may lose. However, despite Kindiki’s demands for the legal case to be dropped, the issue is unlikely to be resolved before the court’s next scheduled hearing on January 25, 2025. Tensions over the IEBC’s reconstitution and the members of the selection panel will likely persist. 

Current Situation – Reports indicate that the Speaker’s office confirmed that Johathan Fonati Koffa remains safe and investigations were launched. Additionally, on December 6, the Supreme Court, ruling on an appeal on the parliamentary leadership crisis, declared that the issue is outside its jurisdiction and an internal legislative matter. The court added that any actions by the majority bloc taken outside a constitutional framework remain void. The majority block backing Richard Koon and Koffa’s supporters, both hailed the judgment. 

Assessments & Forecast – This comes amid heightened tensions between pro-Koon and pro-Koffa factions over the speaker’s position. The death threat against Koffa reflects a deteriorating political climate as pro-Koon and pro-Koffa factions vie for dominance. The response by both sides indicates that they both interpret the Supreme Court ruling as favorable. The pro-Koon faction likely interprets the court’s admittance of limited jurisdiction as affirming Koon’s leadership, while the pro-Koffa faction interprets the declaration of unconstitutional actions as void, as a restoration of Koffa. While Koon may attempt to proceed with legislative actions based on the judgment, confusion and heightened tensions will likely persist amid a continued parliamentary impasse.

Current Situation – Reports indicate that bandits abducted about 25 people from Gidan Goga, Maradun LGA, Zamfara State. This is allegedly the corrected count after initial reports claimed that 50 people were abducted. The bandits reportedly raided the village and fired randomly. Local authorities appealed to the government to deploy more security personnel to prevent similar attacks. The bandits reportedly rejected a 1,800 USD ransom offer by local authorities. 

Assessments & Forecast – This comes amid recurring bandit attacks in northwestern and north-central states including Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara. Banditry remains entrenched in Gidan Goga, with recurring attacks and bandits also previously imposing levies on locals. The attack aligns with bandits’ tendency to abduct large groups of locals for kidnap-for-ransom schemes to maximize economic gains. This is also evidenced by the bandits rejecting the offered sum, with the bandits expected to demand a larger sum of money for releasing the abductees. While authorities may deploy security forces to the town to showcase responsiveness to the locals’ concerns, the overall situation is unlikely to change, with insecurity due to entrenched banditry likely persisting across north-central and northwestern Nigeria.

Current Situation – In an official statement, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) stated they carried out preemptive airstrikes in the southeastern outskirts of El-Fasher, destroying unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) launchpads used by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It added that RSF troops continued to flee outside El-Fasher. SAF also conducted airstrikes on Nyala airport, South Darfur State, and targeted a market in North Darfur State’s Kabkabiya, resulting in over 80 civilian casualties. 

Assessments & Forecast – SAF’s preemptive strike in El-Fasher comes amid persisting intense fighting in the last SAF-controlled state capital in Darfur. SAF’s claim that RSF troops were fleeing the city is likely exaggerated, with RSF still maintaining a significant presence in El-Fasher. Therefore, SAF’s claim may be intended to boost troop morale by showcasing RSF’s wavering strength and presence near El-Fasher. SAF’s increasing reliance on airstrikes to weaken RSF is also evidenced by the targeting of Nyala airport which is alleged to be used by RSF for arms transfers. However, persisting airstrikes will likely exacerbate the already deteriorated humanitarian crisis, with RSF capitalizing on civilian casualties to discredit SAF as fighting persists across conflict theaters.

Current Situation – Reports indicate that President Hassan announced that the information sector will be transferred to the Ministry of Culture, Arts, and Sports, led by Palamagamba Kabudi. Additional notable appointments include Jerry Silaa as Minister for Communication and Information Technology and Innocent Bashungwa as Minister of Home Affairs. Several administrative and diplomatic posts were also restructured.

Assessments & Forecast – This comes after the November 27 Civic elections, during which her Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party recorded a landslide victory with over 98 percent of the total leadership seats in villages and neighborhoods. In this context, the reshuffle and reorganization of some ministries are likely part of preparations for the October 2025 general elections with President Hassan possibly seeking to curb potential internal tensions and challenges while ensuring that top positions are occupied by trusted loyal figures. Therefore, while the government might present these changes as intended to mitigate performance gaps and address public dissatisfaction, they are likely intended to allow Hassan to further consolidate her dominance, both internally in the CCM and on the national political landscape. Additional reshuffles are possible over the coming months.