This report reviews notable events this week in the Middle East and North Africa. These include the facilitation of evacuations from Afghanistan by Gulf countries, violent riots along the Israel-Gaza Strip border fence, the Kuwait Finance Minister’s offer of resignation amid fiscal crisis, attempted car bomb attack in Libya’s Jufra District by the Islamic State (IS), and the indefinite extension of the parliament’s suspension by the Tunisian president.  

Notable developments: 

1. On August 20 and 23, the UAE and Kuwait, respectively agreed to host 5,000 Afghan refugees before they depart for third countries.  
2. On August 21, Bahrain announced that it would allow US evacuation flights from Afghanistan to use its transit facilities.   
3. On August 21, US President Joe Biden praised Qatar’s “generous support” for hosting passengers evacuated from Afghanistan.  

ANALYSIS: The measures by the Gulf countries come amid urgent evacuations of US and other foreign personnel from Afghanistan following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul on August 15. The capture of the Afghan capital has resulted in a crisis, with media outlets showing pictures of thousands of Afghans attempting to flee the country by holding on to US cargo planes. The Gulf countries’ role in facilitating US military evacuations is a timely intervention in favor of Washington, which is likely intended to prevent further reputational damage to Washington. These decisions are in line with the long-standing strategic partnerships between the US and these Gulf countries, particularly in the security spheres exemplified by the fact that Manama and Doha house some of the US’s largest military installations in the Middle East region. Biden’s positive statements with regards to Qatar reiterates Doha’s pivotal role in facilitating Washington’s relations with belligerent actors given that it allowed the Taliban to open a political office in Qatar in 2013 and has assisted in holding of intra-Afghan peace talks supported by Washington over past years. Overall, these actions are likely to contribute toward a stronger partnership with the US, which these Gulf countries consider as a crucial foreign policy objective. 

Notable developments: 

1. A mechanism for the UN to directly transfer Qatari funds to impoverished Gazan families without it passing through Hamas was announced on August 19. 
2. On August 21, at least 41 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were wounded in riots along the Israel-Gaza Strip border fence.  
3. Incendiary balloons emanating from the Gaza Strip caused nine wildfires in southern Israel on August 23. The IDF conducted retaliatory airstrikes against Hamas during the overnight hours of August 21-22 and 23-24.

ANALYSIS: While the August 21 riots began as a commemorative event marking the 1969 arson attack on Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa Mosque, the violent event reveals Hamas’ efforts to threaten Israel by escalating hostilities. This is because Hamas seeks exclusive supervision of Qatari aid into Gaza and the former deems that sustaining hostilities along the enclave may pressure Israel into providing concessions. While Israel aims to avoid an escalation, it will maintain its policy of forceful retaliation against all attacks emanating from Hamas-administered territory. Egypt’s subsequent and indefinite closure of the Rafah border crossing with the Gaza Strip on August 23, which is the only crossing out of Gaza not controlled by Israel, likely constituted punitory action against Hamas for the border fence violence. This is because Egypt is heavily invested in mediating the fragile ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas that ended the 11-day armed conflict in May. However, this is unlikely to stop Hamas from launching incendiary balloons and instigating violence along the border fence with Israel over the coming days, particularly given the group’s calls for protests along the frontier on August 25.  

Notable Developments:  

1. According to August 18 reports, Finance Minister Khalifa Hamade offered his resignation to Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Sabah. The PM and the Emir have not yet approved this move.   

ANALYSIS: Hamade’s resignation follows the cabinet’s August 17 instructions to limit public spending by at least ten percent to address the debt crisis. On August 7, Kuwait reported a record budget deficit increase of approximately 175 percent in 2020-21. As part of spending limitations, authorities instructed budget cuts on government-related overseas travel expenses, medical treatments for Kuwaiti nationals, and revision of financial incentives granted to locals earning more than 3,000 Kuwaiti Dinars in the private sector. While Hamade did not specify the reason for his resignation, he reportedly felt “marginalized in the decision-making process including on selecting the board of the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) sovereign fund”. Thus, it is possible that Hamade’s decision was based on his perception that the government did not take his policy recommendations into consideration, including for the August 17 decision. Moreover, as the KIA is managed by the Ministry of Finance, Hamade’s reported lack of involvement in the board’s selection likely further fuelled the minister’s assessment that the cabinet was disregarding him. This highlights the significant differences over policymaking among cabinet members, which will prolong the passage of key economic reforms. This, coupled with the fact that the August 17 instructions are unlikely to offset the government’s financial reserve losses, will further exacerbate Kuwait’s fiscal crisis over the coming months. 

Notable Developments: 

1. The Libyan National Army (LNA) spokesperson stated that an Islamic State (IS) operative attempted to conduct a suicide car bomb attack at an LNA checkpoint at the entrance to Jufra District’s Zillah on August 22. No casualties were reported and the perpetrator was shot and apprehended.  
2. According to picture material, the attack caused a caravan and several LNA vehicles to catch fire. There were no signs that an explosion occurred. 
3. On August 23, IS claimed the attack.

ANALYSIS: The indications that the attack merely caused a fire, did not incur casualties among LNA personnel, and ended in the militant’s neutralization signals towards the overall failure of the attempted attack. This indicates the shortcomings in the execution of the attack, and thus to the existing gaps in the training of IS operatives in the region. That said, the incident shows that IS retains operational capabilities in southern Libya, regardless of its qualities, and that it is proactively seeking to carry out high-profile attacks. This was also highlighted on June 6, when the group conducted a car bomb attack at an LNA checkpoint near Sebha, 350 km southwest of Zillah, which was followed by other security-related incidents involving IS militants over the course of June-July. In this context, the militants will likely seek to carry out further attacks in southern and central Libya over the coming weeks and months. LNA forces will likely initiate security operations in the region, particularly around the Haruj Mountain area, over the coming days, in order to mitigate this threat.  

Notable Developments:  

1. On August 18, President Kais Saied made new appointments to the positions of director-general of national security and head of the Tunisian National Guard.    
2. On August 20, the President terminated the duties of the Secretary-General of the National Anti-Corruption Authority (INLUCC). Security forces closed the INLUCC headquarters.   
3. As per August 22 reports, an individual was arrested for plotting President Saied’s assassination. 
4. On August 23, President Saied extended the suspension of parliament indefinitely.  

ANALYSIS: President Saied has dismissed several government officials and appointed new individuals to these positions since he assumed all executive powers on July 25. These latest appointments and the changes made at the INLUCC will enable Saied to consolidate control over the country’s security apparatus and orchestrate corruption charges against state officials. Regarding the arrest of an individual for “inciting” the assassination of Saied on social media, no indication was provided by authorities that the detainee was caught with weapons or that he had an advanced plan of action. This indicates that he did not pose an imminent threat. However, Saied who is at loggerheads with the Ennahda Movement, the largest political party in the country, stated that parties with Islamist inclinations are disseminating such “thoughts of assassinations”, to portray them as instigating instability. Having now extended what was supposed to be a month-long suspension of parliament for an indefinite period of time, Saied will likely continue his attempts to solidify maximum control over vital government bodies. This latest measure will reignite political tensions and lead to protests by opposers of Saied, such as Ennahda and its supporters, over the coming days. 

Notable Developments:   

1. On August 18, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with UAE’s national security advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nahyan in Ankara. 
2. Both officials discussed the prospects of consolidating economic ties as well as an array of regional issues of common interest.

ANALYSIS: This meeting is notable given that Turkey and the UAE have not had direct diplomatic engagements in recent years. This is because the relationship between the countries severely deteriorated after Turkey accused the UAE of supporting the 2016 coup against Erdogan. The rift subsequently widened due to their opposing stance in regional disputes in Libya, the 2017 blockade of Qatar by several Arab states as well as their polarizing relationship with the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. The latest meeting follows the April 22 phone call between Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and his Emirati counterpart Abdullah bin Zayed to exchange Ramadan greetings. It, therefore, highlights the determination of both countries to capitalize on the current positive momentum to reset their ties. Turkey has made similar overtures to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in recent months indicating that this meeting is part of Ankara’s broader strategy to restore ties with US allies and reduce its diplomatic isolation in the region. The UAE is likely following in Riyadh and Cairo’s footsteps in terms of exploring new opportunities for cooperation with Turkey following similar reconciliation with Qatar in January. While both Turkey and the UAE will seek to improve ties in the coming months, given their opposing stance on several key regional issues, challenges to rapprochement will persist.  

• Lebanon: The government increased fuel prices by 66 percent on August 22.

• Libya: Libyan National Army (LNA) forces have mobilized into Ash Shwayrif, 340 km south of Tripoli, per August 20 reports. This follows operations by Government of National Unity (GNU)-linked forces in the town.

• Morocco: Reports on August 19 indicated that Morocco will continue operating the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline, which connects Algeria’s Hassi R’mel field to Spain’s Andalusia via Morocco, beyond October 2021. The original contract was set to expire on October 31.

• Oman: The government lifted the nationwide night curfew on August 21. Authorities further announced that from September 1, it will become mandatory for individuals above the age of 18 to be fully vaccinated before entering the country.

• Qatar: On August 18, the Cabinet approved a draft law allowing non-Qataris to own 100 percent capital in the following banks: Qatar National Bank (QNB), Qatar Islamic Bank (al-Masraf), Commercial Bank, and Masraf al-Rayam.

• Syria: On August 21, a US-led Coalition’s fighter aircraft shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Deir Ezzor’s Green Village mission support site, south of al-Omar Oil Field, where 900 US military personnel are reportedly stationed.

• Syria & Israel: Israel reportedly conducted strikes against sites around Rif Dimashq Governorate’s Qara and Homs during the overnight hours of August 19-20. The strikes were reportedly launched from Lebanese airspace.

• Tunisia & Libya: Reports from August 22 indicated that Tunisia will keep its borders with Libya closed until further notice. This followed an August 19 announcement by Libya that land, air, and sea crossings between the countries will reopen.

• UAE: On August 19, authorities lifted the COVID-19-related night curfew in Abu Dhabi. 

• August 28: The UAE will mark Emirati Women’s Day. 

• August 29: The Jerusalem Night Run will take place in Israel’s capital.

• August 29: The UAE’s flagship carrier Emirates will resume flights to Nigeria.

• August 30: Turkey will mark Victory Day to commemorate the country’s independence in 1922.

• September 1: Schools in Israel are slated to reopen despite an ongoing rise of COVID-19 infections.

• September 1: Unvaccinated private-sector employees in Jordan will have to present a negative COVID-19 certificate 72 hours before every Sunday and Thursday.

• September 1: Travelers entering Oman will be required to be fully inoculated and present a negative PCR test. They will no longer be required to undergo institutional quarantine. Vaccinated travelers arriving from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan will be allowed to enter the Sultanate.