• The lull in militant attacks continued into February, which the government attributes to ongoing security operations. This can also be a result of poor weather conditions and the militants’ increasing logistical difficulties. The slowdown in activity is expected to be temporary, particularly as the attacks on February 15-16 illustrate the militants’ continued presence in and apparent control over significant parts of Mocimboa da Praia District.
• The government claimed to have killed two “Arab” militants in security operations in February. This should be taken with caution given the source, but may suggest an increasing importance to the Cabo Delgado insurgency in the wider jihadi map.
• Two British journalists were expelled on February 16, likely over their critical coverage of the Cabo Delgado insurgency. This aligns with the government’s continuous efforts to promote its narrative of counter-militancy achievements and will likely come in tandem with greater efforts to suppress independent coverage of the conflict.

The following notable security incidents were reported in Cabo Delgado Province:

• Reports from February 9 indicate that the defense and security forces (FDS) deployed more troops in Nangade District and claimed to have destroyed militant bases and inflicted heavy casualties during security operations across Muidumbe, Macomia, and Mocimboa da Praia districts, with the militants also lacking supplies and ammunition. The Ministry of Defense further reportedly claimed that among the killed militants were two “Arabs” and a Tanzanian national.
• The government expelled two British journalists on February 16 and banned them from the country for ten years. The official reason for the expulsion was that they lacked press registration from the UK, though there is no press registration in the UK.
• Reports from February 16 indicate that the government proposed a new press law, which stipulates that media outlets can only be run by Mozambican nationals and foreign publishing companies must be at least 80 percent Mozambican-owned. The law will also demand official registration of media outlets under threat of closure, and journalists will be required to carry cards issued by the authorities.
• Militants reportedly released five women in Macomia District whom they had abducted, according to February 16 reports. The captives were cited as saying that the militants told them they were free to go due to food shortages and other logistical difficulties.
• Reports from February 17 cite traders as accusing the military of delaying escorts for convoys in Palma District, which contributes to high food prices. This followed reports from February 1 and 2 that insecurity had led to temporary closures on the Nangade-Palma road.

1. Recent weeks have continued to see a noticeable reduction in militant attacks reported in Cabo Delgado Province. This is highly notable as January reported the fewest number of attacks per month since October 2019, with February seeing a similar lull thus far. The government has attributed this to a series of successful security operations, though there are likely several other factors involved. This includes the persistent difficult weather conditions and reports that militants are experiencing significant logistical challenges, including shortages of food and equipment. While this has been the motive for militants to raid villages in the past, it is possible that this tactic has become increasingly ineffective given the large-scale displacement of civilians. Efforts to seize resources were also seen in the February 16 attacks on the military, as this serves the dual purpose of undermining the security forces and seizing the soldiers’ weapons and supplies after they fled. The retreat of the soldiers not only from the road but from some of the villages additionally suggests that militants retain significant control over Mocimboa da Praia District.
2. FORECAST: With that said, it is unlikely that this decline in the number of attacks will be prolonged. The militants continue to be active and there is no indication of any significant degradation of their capabilities or erosion of the militants’ territorial control, particularly in Mocimboa da Praia District. The FDS’s claims regarding their own operational achievements are likely exaggerated in an attempt to project strength and reassure the population as well as international investors that they have improved the security outlook. However, the reported continuation of military escorts for convoys moving goods along the Nangade-Palma axis nonetheless suggests that the situation remains volatile and that civilians and businesses have low confidence in their safety in the region. It is likely that militant attacks on FDS convoys or positions will continue in the coming weeks, which will allow them to seize further supplies and enable further attacks.
3. The government’s claim to have killed two “Arabs” during security operations in early February was notable, though should be regarded with caution given the source. Should their identities be confirmed, this could suggest that they are members of the Islamic State (IS) from other jihadist theaters or potentially dispatched by IS central. Their presence could then contribute greater ideological as well as tactical and technical guidance. This possibility aligns with the general evolution that the insurgency in Mozambique has been through in the period since IS claimed its first attack in Cabo Delgado in June 2019, with more substantial advances taking place after an IS leader from Somalia allegedly traveled to Mozambique in early 2020. Further influence from foreign jihadists could help build the militants’ capabilities in terms of governance and organization in addition to other tactical direction. With that said, it remains highly possible that the Mozambican government misidentified these individuals or intentionally sought to highlight the presence of foreign elements to support their narrative that Cabo Delgado’s insurgency is fueled by foreigners rather than being a homegrown movement with local grievances.
4. The government’s efforts to control the narrative and information from Cabo Delgado was further underscored by the expulsion of the British journalists and introduction of new press laws. Despite stating a legal justification for the expulsion, it is likely that the authentic motivation was a response to critical coverage that the journalists led regarding the conflict. These journalists and their publication have released information on attacks and cast doubt on the government’s activity or ability to quell the threat, which contrasts with the official narrative of counterinsurgency successes. This aligns with the government’s repeated efforts to prevent journalists from traveling to Cabo Delgado to report on the conflict at all. FORECAST: The new press law is likely to be endorsed by parliament, which will further enable the government to suppress media operations in the country, particularly those reporting on Cabo Delgado as well as the internal conflict with Renamo in the central provinces. This effort to undermine independent coverage will likely be combined with further official and semi-official government press releases that showcase the military’s successes.

1. Avoid all travel to northern and eastern Cabo Delgado Province in light of the threat from the ongoing Islamist insurgency.
2. Refrain from overland travel particularly in Cabo Delgado’s Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Muidumbe, Palma, and Quissanga districts given ongoing security threats and poor infrastructure.