• Between September 14-19, the Syrian government established reconciliation centers in several rebel strongholds of Daraa Province, including Tafas. This shows the government’s partial success in overpowering the locals to achieve its objectives through the threat of a prolonged siege and hostilities. 
• On September 19, the Syrian and Jordanian chiefs of staff met in Amman to discuss security matters regarding border security between the countries. The development showcases the growing recognition of the Syrian government by regional governments, which will likely persist over the coming months.  
• On September 18, the Islamic State (IS) claimed the September 17 attack against energy infrastructures in Rif Dimashq, south of Damascus. This indicates the jihadists’ growing desire to target civilian infrastructure to raise their profile.  
• Overall, IS militants may seek to conduct additional attacks against civilian infrastructure in Rif Dimashq as well as other areas in the country, as part of the group’s “economic war” campaign.   

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported: 

Aleppo Province 

Damascus Province 

Daraa Province 

Hasakah Province 

Homs Province 

Rif Dimashq Province 

Political Developments 

De-escalation in Daraa Province  

1. The latest developments, including the fact that no on-ground hostilities have been reported in Daraa Province since September 12, indicate that the Russian-mediated ceasefire is currently being upheld in the province. The pro-government forces’ entrance into Daraa al-Balad and the establishment of reconciliation offices within Yadouda, Muzayrib, and Tafas, which represents the second-largest pro-rebel stronghold in the province highlights the overall success of the latest negotiations. The reported transfer of 300 rebels out of Tafas and the surrender of over 100 weapons by locals to the Syrian government on September 19 further signals the latter’s ability to partly achieve its objective and overpower the locals through the threat of a prolonged siege that could cause significant hardships for the locals. This is evidenced by the fact that since July, more than 38,000 civilians have fled the southern part of Daraa and the UN has reported on extensive shortages of crucial commodities in the province.  
2. FORECAST: Over the coming days and weeks, pro-government forces will likely further assert their control over pro-rebel areas, particularly Daraa al-Balad and Tafas, which will lead to an overall de-escalation in conflict. The reconciliation mechanism is likely to significantly weaken the pro-rebel camp in the province over the coming weeks, as at least some rebels will renounce their anti-government activities, hand over their arms, and agree to be deported to other parts of the country. However, it is plausible that other rebel elements will resort to low-profile attacks such as targeted killings of pro-government personnel in the region. Underlying tensions between large segments of Daraa and the Syrian government will persist over the coming months.    

Russia’s geostrategic ambitions in southern Syria 

1. Russia’s role in being able to spearhead the mediation efforts as well as oversee the enforcement of the ceasefire in Daraa Province highlights Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s ability to leverage the support of his foreign backers to promote his agenda in southern Syria. Russia’s motivation for involvement in Daraa shows its geostrategic ambitions to situate itself as the main security guarantor in the country. It likely aims to demonstrate to its regional actors such as Jordan and Israel, who are allies of the US, that it is able to deliver on the expectations placed on it. For instance, on August 23, during a meeting in Moscow between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Jordan’s King Abdullah II, the latter stated while addressing the former that “[Russia] I think, plays the most stable role” in Syria. Additionally, Moscow likely aims to step in before potential hostilities occur near the Syria-Israel border should Iranian-linked militias who dominate the pro-government forces cement their control in Daraa and use it to target Israeli troops in the region. Israel will likely react to such provocations with strong force, thus potentially aggravating hostilities and undermining Russia’s mediation efforts in the province. Therefore, Russia’s investment in southern Syria shows that it aims to gradually position itself as the primary security guarantor at a time when Assad continues to face domestic opposition to establishing authority without Russia, with whom the locals in Daraa are seemingly willing to negotiate as opposed to the government. 

High-profile meeting between Jordanian, Syrian security officials  

1. The meeting between the Jordanian and Syrian heads of security in Amman on September 19 was likely facilitated by the Syrian government’s ability to de-escalate the hostilities in the Daraa Province over the past week. The recent hostilities in Syria’s southern border province have prompted Jordanian authorities to intermittently close the border crossings between the two countries. The border area is also characterized by extensive drug and weapons smuggling operations from Syria into Jordan, often prompting JAF forces to use live fire against the smugglers. Thus, the current meeting was likely pushed for by Amman in order to coordinate security measures along the two countries’ shared border. Furthermore, the development comes amid growing regional recognition of the Syrian government by several Arab governments, namely Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, over these parties’ plan to provide Egyptian natural gas to Lebanon through the Arab Gas Pipeline which runs through Syria. The Arab Gas Pipeline runs through Jordan’s Mafrak into Syria’s Daraa Province, from where it leads east of Damascus to Homs. Thus, the current high-profile meeting likely also dealt with potential Syrian-Jordanian coordination measures along the border to facilitate the protection of the infrastructure.  
2. FORECAST: Regional governments will likely seek to cooperate with Damascus on matters that have a broader impact on the region, which will overall translate as increased recognition of the Bashar al-Assad-led government. The Syrian and Jordanian governments will likely seek further cooperation, particularly on border security over the coming weeks and months. However, at least some of the transnational contraband activity in the area is believed to be linked to Lebanese Hezbollah, an ally of the Syrian government, which the pro-government forces are unlikely to challenge. International sanctions, particularly the US-imposed Caesar Act which went into force on June 17, 2020, will also continue to be a straining factor for the development of economic cooperation between Syria and its neighbors over the long term.   

IS claim of attack against energy infrastructure in Rif Dimashq 

1. The claimed attack highlights IS’s ability to target critical energy infrastructure in Rif Dimashq’s southern, outlying areas, approximately 25 km south of the capital. Rif Dimashq is not considered to be one of IS’s areas of operations in Syria, although attacks in the area are not entirely unprecedented. The closest such area where IS activity was being recorded over the past year is the Daraa Province, where the group occasionally conducts attacks against pro-Syrian government forces. Given the proximity of Daraa Province to Rif Dimashq, it is plausible that IS cells from Daraa traveled north to establish the necessary means to conduct the current attack. In addition, contrary to other regions such as Iraq, IS has more rarely conducted attacks against civilian infrastructure in Syria, as part of what the jihadists call their “economic war”. Taken as a whole, the current development points towards a growing desire by the militants to conduct such types of attacks and prompt disruptions to critical civilian infrastructure.  
2. The incident is also particularly notable as the two affected power stations are also connected to the Arab Gas Pipeline, which runs through Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. As mentioned above, the four countries’ governments agreed to transfer Egyptian gas to Lebanon via this pipeline. The latest attack thus also highlights the vulnerability of this regional project to militant attacks, particularly in the section where the pipeline runs in vast outlying areas east of Daraa and Damascus cities towards Homs. FORECAST: The Syrian government will seek to dedicate resources to bolster security around energy infrastructures, including the Arab Gas Pipeline to ensure the materialization of the agreement with Cairo, Amman, and Beirut. Nonetheless, jihadists may seek to further target sensitive infrastructures such as power grids or other gas pipelines in the region over the coming weeks.   

1. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Damascus at this time. Those continuing to operate in the city should adhere to all security precautions regarding the threat of militant attacks and potential airstrikes.   
2. Avoid the vicinity of military installations throughout Syria as well as the Syria-Israel border area due to the persistent risk of Israeli strikes.  
3. Those seeking to enter Syria are advised to confirm the status of crossing points at both foreign borders and within the country as well as the identity of security forces stationed at various checkpoints. In the event that a security checkpoint is encountered, act respectfully and patiently while cooperating fully with security personnel. Refrain from photographing security personnel or documenting events.  
4. Avoid all travel to Aleppo, Hama, Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, and Raqqa provinces due to persistent armed clashes, criminal and militant activity, the heightened risk of kidnappings targeting foreigners, and very poor infrastructure.  
5. Those remaining in Aleppo should minimize movement within the city and avoid all travel to the city’s western and northwestern districts due to periodic artillery shelling between militant groups and government forces.  
6. Avoid nonessential travel to Latakia and Tartus given the prevalence of anti-Western sentiments, the potential for militant attacks, and poor infrastructure.   
7. Western nationals are advised to maintain a low profile throughout Syria due to hostile sentiment towards various foreign governments among the populace.   
8. In government-held territory, avoid making any comments or publishing online statements that are critical of the Syrian government or President Bashar al-Assad and his policies. Refrain from discussing politically sensitive topics, such as Syria’s treatment of prisoners, the Syrian civil war and various actors involved, the presence of Iran, Russian, Turkish, or American troops, or international sanctions against the Syrian government. The vocalization of these sentiments is likely to lead to detention and prosecution.  
9. In Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-held territory in Idlib Province, cooperate with the authorities at all times and adhere to religious rules and regulations pertaining to modest dress and behavior. Refrain from vocalizing support for the Syrian government or President Assad as such activities are likely to lead to detention and potential interrogation.   
10. In areas with strong Turkish influence or control, refrain from all criticism of Turkey and its operations in northern Syria and avoid declaring support for the Kurdish cause or the People’s Protection Unit (YPG)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).