• On July 9, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted to extend the use of Idlib’s Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing for the delivery of humanitarian aid for at least an additional six months. The development will help to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Idlib’s rebel, and jihadist-controlled territories.
• On July 10-11, a mortar attack targeted Deir Ezzor’s Koniko Gas Field, and on July 11-13, two rocket attacks reportedly targeted US forces near al-Omar Oil Field. The incidents likely constitute retaliation by Iran-backed Shiite militias for a July 27 US airstrikes targeting their positions along the Syria-Iraq border area. Amid tensions, further attacks may recur in the area in the coming days.
• On July 11, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) announced the arrest of ten Islamic State (IS) militants in Idlib’s Kafr Tekharim and Foua. The presence of IS cells in Idlib, despite HTS’s operations, points to the region’s significance for IS’s logistical operations. It also highlights the risk that is posed to civilians and foreign nationals operating in the area, by the jihadists.
• Exchanges of shelling between rebel and jihadist groups, on the one side, and pro-government forces, on the other, in and around Idlib will persist over the coming days. This is despite the extension of the humanitarian program to Idlib constituting a form of consent by Russia,  the Syrian government’s main backer, towards international stakeholders.

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported:

Daraa Province

Deir Ezzor Province

Homs Province

Idlib Province

Raqqa Province

Political Development

1. The attacks against US forces in Deir Ezzor Province come amid currently heightened tensions between the US and Iran-backed factions in both Iraq and Syria. These attacks in Syria started after Washington carried out airstrikes on July 27 against positions of Iran-backed factions along the Syrian-Iraqi border, which were meant to reinstate US deterrence. Thus, the latest attacks reflect Iran-backed factions’ continued willingness to target American forces in SDF-controlled areas along the Euphrates. As these attacks were yet to have triggered a wide US response, it is currently likely that Washington seeks to deescalate the situation rather than to hold the militias accountable. FORECAST: However, additional attacks may still draw retaliatory action by the US, particularly if future attacks would lead to casualties among US personnel.  
2. The UNSC resolution on the continuation of humanitarian aid through the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing with Turkey constitutes an important achievement for the UN-led humanitarian program and for the communities that are based in Idlib. This is because the measure will secure the only channel for the delivery of aid that goes straight from the international donors to the rebel-held areas. This program was set up in 2014 through several border crossings to prevent the Bashar al-Assad-led government from manipulating humanitarian aid delivery in favor of pro-government elements and as a coercion measure against rebels. Since then, Russia, the primary backer of the Syrian government which has a veto power within the UNSC, has used its veto power to terminate operations through several other routes, leaving the Bab al-Hawa the only functioning route for the UN-sponsored program. For this reason, the Bab al-Hawa border crossing is essential for the Rebel and Jihadist-held Idlib. Russia has threatened to revoke its support for the extension of the program, for which international stakeholders were concerned up until now. Thus, it is likely that major concessions were given to Russia by international stakeholders to secure the renewal of the mandate. Given that the humanitarian situation has also been deteriorating in government-held areas of Syria, with the local currency significantly devaluating and prices of goods, such as bread and fuel rising, it is possible that such concessions were in the form of extended humanitarian aid or other forms of assistance to government-held areas. FORECAST: The development will help to mitigate further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria, particularly in rebel and jihadist-held areas of Idlib over the coming months. 
3. The detention of ten IS operatives in Idlib’s Kafr Tekharim and Foua is part of a continued clampdown on IS by HTS. Idlib constitutes a strategic location for IS due to the fact that it contains the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing, the only functioning route for the movement of humanitarian aid as well as refugees between Syria and Turkey. For this reason, IS is likely attempting to capitalize on the region for its logistical operations, which likely partially include movement in and out of Turkey. The pressure that the HTS is placing on IS thus likely has a significant adverse impact on IS in Syria as a whole, particularly since the jihadist militant group has lost all of its territorial control in both Syria and Iraq over the past two years. Regardless, the presence of IS operatives in several villages and in possession of arms points towards the remaining risk that IS operative cells pose throughout Idlib. This risk extends to civilians and western nationals operating in the region. 

1. Avoid nonessential travel to Damascus at this time while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to standard security precautions regarding the threat of militant attacks and potential airstrikes. In addition, it is advised to avoid all travel to the vicinity of military installations due to the potential for Israeli Air Force (IAF) airstrikes.
2. Avoid all travel to outlying areas and cities including Homs, Hama, and Idlib due to persistent fighting and heightened risk of kidnapping targeting foreigners, particularly in combat zones and rebel-held areas.
3. Avoid all travel to the border area with Israel given the persistent risk of Israeli Air Force (IAF) and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes targeting positions in the region.
4. Avoid all travel to the Kurdish-controlled areas in northern and eastern Syria, including Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, in light of the persistence of near-daily acts of militancy by jihadist militant operatives in these regions.
5. Those seeking to enter Syria are advised to confirm the status of their crossing points and final destinations, remaining aware of recent kidnapping incidents and the nature of military forces deployed in those areas.
6. Those remaining in Aleppo should minimize movement within the city and avoid all travel to the cities western and northwestern districts given the persistence of indiscriminate mutual artillery shelling between militant groups and government forces. An escalation of armed conflict remains possible.
7. Those continuing to operate in Damascus and Aleppo should ensure that contingency and emergency evacuation plans are updated due to the remaining potential for a deterioration of the security situation.
8. Avoid non-essential travel to government-controlled areas, including Latakia and Tartus, given the prevalence of significant anti-western sentiments, as well as a latent threat of militant attacks.
9. In case overland travel between Damascus and Latakia cannot be avoided, we currently recommend crossing out of Syria via the Damascus-Beirut Highway and crossing back via the Coastal Road.
10. In the event that a security checkpoint is encountered, act respectfully and patiently, while cooperating fully with security personnel. Refrain from photographing security personnel or documenting events.
11. As a general rule, nationals from North America and Europe are advised to maintain a low profile throughout Syria given increased negative sentiment against various foreign governments among broad segments of the populace. In government-controlled areas, strictly refrain from discussing politically sensitive topics or making comments critical of government and political institutions, as this may lead to prosecution or arrest.