• On March 11, several new missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval mines were showcased by the Houthis in an exhibition. This includes the “Zaid” UAV, which is stated to have an operational range of 2500 km, significantly exceeding the proclaimed operational ranges of other explosive-laden UAVs.
• On March 13, the Houthis rejected a US-proposed ceasefire claiming that it represents the “Saudi and international vision”. Although no details regarding the plan have been disclosed, it nevertheless underscores Washington’s resolve to increase its diplomatic engagement in Yemen. 
• Anti-Houthi forces have claimed several advances in Taiz Governorate between March 2-16. They will likely focus on gaining as much territory south of the N3 highway that are under Houthi control, between Taiz city and Mocha over the coming days. 
• On March 16, pro-STC protesters stormed the Presidential Palace in Aden, which is guarded by STC-linked security forces. This is particularly liable to fuel the distrust between the STC and Hadi officials. 
• On March 16, the Saudi-led Coalition intercepted a Houthi-launched explosive-laden vessel near Hodeidah’s al-Salif. This highlights the continued threat to maritime activity in the Red Sea’s international waters. 
• Overall, heavy fighting is likely to persist between the Houthi and anti-Houthi forces across Marib, Taiz, and Hajjah governorates over the coming days. Additionally, further socio-economic protests, which have the potential to turn violent, are likely in the southern provinces of Aden and Hadramout. 

Across the country, the following incidents have been reported:

Aden Governorate

Bayda Governorate

Hadramout Governorate

Hajjah Governorate

Hodeidah Governorate

Marib Governorate

Sanaa Governorate

Taiz Governorate

Asir, Jeddah, Jazan, Eastern Provinces; Saudi Arabia

General Developments 

1. The Houthis’ March 11 “Exhibition of Military Productions” comes in the context of its annual exhibitions wherein the Shiite group showcases new and modified weapons that are claimed to be locally-developed within Yemeni territory. Among the several new missiles and combat UAVs that were presented, the “Waid” UAV is one of the most significant. The Houthis claimed that this UAV has a range of over 2500 km, significantly exceeding the proclaimed operational ranges of its other explosive-laden UAVs. Moreover, picture material indicates certain resemblance between the “Waid” UAV and the Iran-made “Shahed-136” suicide UAV, remnants of which were discovered in al-Jawf Governorate in January. The exhibition of new, purportedly more sophisticated long-range weapons by the Houthis also comes amid their marked escalation of cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia, as highlighted by the score of attacks against the Kingdom reported between March 2-15. In this context, by unveiling advanced weapons, the Houthis likely aim to deter Riyadh and emphasize that the latter’s blockade on Houthi-held territory and continued military support for the anti-Houthi forces in Yemen will continue to result in significant attacks within Saudi territory. FORECAST: Given that multiple weapons, including the naval mines that were recently showcased are perceived to be “Iranian-made”, the Saudi-led Coalition and the Hadi-led government will seek to emphasize Iran’s role in contributing to the instability in Yemen as well as the increased threat it poses to navigation in the Red Sea’s international waters. Nevertheless, as hostilities persist, the Houthis will likely claim future attacks using some of the newly unveiled arms over the coming weeks and months. 
2. The Houthis’ March 13 rejection of a US-proposed ceasefire comes amid the US President Joe Biden-led administration’s bolstered efforts to foster peace talks between the Houthis and the Hadi-led government. In this context, the US Special Envoy for Yemen, Timothy Lenderking, reportedly met with the Houthis’ chief negotiator in Muscat on February 26. This meeting was part of Lenderking’s visit to the Gulf region, wherein he met with several officials, including from Saudi, “in an effort to push the parties closer to a ceasefire”. Although no details regarding the ceasefire plan have been disclosed, it underscores Washington’s resolve to increase its diplomatic engagement in the conflict in Yemen. However, the Houthis’ rejection of the proposed ceasefire and their discourse on the matter reflects their perception that Washington is promoting the interests of the Saudi-led bloc in Yemen and the overall distrust harbored by the Shiite group towards the US. Moreover, since the Biden-led administration’s inauguration, the Houthis have intensified their cross-border aerial attacks against strategic infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and renewed their offensives to advance towards Marib city. Thus, it is possible that the Shiite group is attempting to both project its ability to pose a threat to Saudi Arabia’s security environment and make further gains in the oil-rich Marib Governorate to strengthen its negotiating power vis-a-vis the anti-Houthi forces. FORECAST: Given that President Biden has stated that Lenderking will “work with the UN envoy and all parties of the conflict to push for a diplomatic resolution”, the US will continue its efforts to promote peace dialogue over the coming months. However, despite such efforts, the Houthis will likely continue to try to increase their military pressure on the Saudi-led Coalition. This will manifest in the form of persistent cross-border attacks towards Saudi Arabia and additional offensives in Marib Governorate over the coming weeks.
3. The significant territorial advances made by the anti-Houthi forces in Taiz since the start of March come amid an escalation of hostilities between anti-Houthi and Houthi forces in several fronts in the country, inluding Marib, al-Jawf, and Hajjah. The momentum gained by the anti-Houthi forces in Taiz is partially a result of the reconciliation between the Hadi government and the STC, which allowed for the establishment of a joint government, leading to an overall decrease in military confrontations between the two. This likely allowed the Hadi-led government to allocate forces from southern Yemen to the frontlines in and around Taiz, which bolsters the anti-Houthi momentum. FORECAST: The advances in the districts of Jabal Habashy, Maqbanah, al-Maafer, and al-Wazi’iyah, to the west of Taiz city indicate that the anti-Houthi forces’ primary goal over the coming days and weeks will be to gain as much control over territories south of the N3 highway that are under Houthi control. This would allow anti-Houthi forces to move more easily between Mocha and Taiz city, which would further facilitate their operations. In this context, hostilities in the aforementioned districts in Taiz, including within Taiz city’s surroundings will persist over the coming days and weeks. 
4. The storming of Aden’s  Presidential Palace, also known as the Masheeq Palace by protesters on March 16, as well as in Hadramout’s Seiyun on March 15, comes amid persistent and widespread socio-economic grievances held by large segments of the local population. However, reports have indicated that in both instances, particularly in Aden, some of the protesters were seen carrying STC flags. While the Palace houses Hadi government-linked ministers, including the Prime Minister, it is guarded by STC-linked security forces. In this context, the fact the protesters were deemed as STC supporters and that they were not prevented from entering the government building is liable to fuel the perception that the demonstration was at least partly orchestrated by the STC. This is bolstered by the STC President’s March 16 statement that “Aden avenges our sons in Seiyun”. The latest incident is therefore likely to be perceived by pro-Hadi elements as an effort by the STC to assert its popularity and thereby gain more administrative control in Aden and Hadramout. FORECAST: Overall, this incident is likely to further fuel the mistrust between the STC and the Hadi officials. Furthermore, currently, the government lacks the sufficient resources to address the infrastructural and socio-economic issues in its administered governorates. Additionally, the government’s depleted financial resources are further exacerbated by its ongoing anti-Houthi campaign across several fronts. Thus, further unruly protests will be recorded over the coming weeks and months as the economic situation in Yemen is unlikely to improve in the short term.
5. The interception of an explosive-laden boat near Hodeidah’s al-Salif on March 16 by the Saudi-led Coalition comes amid persistent Houthi attempts to conduct attacks in the Red Sea using explosive-laden vessels and naval mines. This represents the second such interception of an explosive-laden vessel by the Coalition in 2021, with a similar event recorded on January 22. The Saudi-led Coalition has long deemed that the Houthis use Hodeidah’s al-Salif and Ras Issa ports to prepare these remote-controlled explosive-laden boats, as they represent two of the closest points to international waters in the Red Sea. The persistent use of such armed vessels highlights the Houthis’ continued efforts to elevate the risk associated with navigating through the Red Sea, as this would have a negative impact on Saudi Arabia’s economy. However, the fact that the Coalition was able to intercept the latest boat close to Yemeni territory, likely before it reached international waters, indicates its heightened vigilance of and ability to gain prior intelligence to mitigate this threat to maritime activity. FORECAST: Overall, the Saudi-led Coalition will likely bolster its military deployment to the Red Sea, particularly off the coast of Hodeidah over the coming weeks. 

1. It is advised to avoid all travel to Sanaa and Aden.
2. In the event of air strikes, it is advised to take shelter in a basement or on the second story level of a concrete building away from windows and the entrance. If no such areas are available, it is advised to take cover under a sturdy object in the center of the home away from windows; lay on the ground while covering your head with your hands.
3. We advise against all travel to outlying areas and overland travel, due to the limited government and security presence, ongoing clashes and airstrikes, as well as the heightened threat of attacks and kidnappings.
4. For those operating in or conducting business with oil facilities, it is advised to consult with us for itinerary and contingency support plans.
5. Foreigners, particularly Westerners, continuing to operate in Yemen are additionally advised to maintain a low profile, exercise heightened vigilance, and avoid locales frequented by foreign, particularly Western nationals. To mitigate the risk of attacks or abductions, ensure that places of stay are equipped with sufficient perimeter security details, alter travel routes, and avoid disclosing sensitive itinerary information to unknown individuals.