Current Situation:  

• On April 16, Argentinian Minister of Security Patricia Bullrich stated that the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah maintains a presence in Chile’s Iquique, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay’s tri-border area, Brazil’s Sao Paulo, and Peru. 
• In response, Chile sent a formal protest note to Buenos Aires.  
• Bullrich also stated that Argentina continues to maintain “high alert” in the northern border and tri-border area. 

Assessments & Forecast: Argentina’s condemnation of Hezbollah’s presence in the region partly reflects its deepening security ties with the USA and Israel since President Javier Milei took office. Additionally, Bullrich’s statement corresponds with the latent threat posed by Hezbollah sleeper cells in Latin America, evidenced by the November 8, 2023, arrest of two Hezbollah-linked individuals in Sao Paulo, Brazil for planning attacks on Jewish establishments. To this end, US senator Marco Rubio also highlighted US sanctions on Chile-based Hezbollah-run companies and criticizing Chile’s reluctance to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization on April 11. With several left-leaning governments in the region, including Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, criticizing Israel’s offensive in Gaza, Buenos Aires and Washington-led scrutiny over Iranian proxy presence in Latin America as well as diplomatic and military ties with Iran will likely remain heightened, particularly amid an escalation in tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran. Bullrich criticizing a “memorandum” between Iran and Bolivia, likely alluding to July 2023 reports on the same concerning bilateral security and defense cooperation, claiming it allowed the entry of 700 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Forces into the latter, underscores the same. 

Current Situation:  

• On April 13, authorities arrested Rafael Pichun, the spokesperson for Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) radical Mapuche group at a bus terminal in Santiago.  
• Pichun allegedly set two trucks on fire and caused injuries to multiple individuals in Canteras sector, Quilleco commune, Bio Bio region on October 13, 2023.  
• Five others, including the nephew of CAM leader Hector Llaitul, were arrested in the attack on October 14, 2023. 

Assessments & Forecast: The arrest highlights efforts to crack down on members of radical Mapuche groups that perpetrate arson attacks targeting forestry and government establishments across Macrozona Sur. This is further supported by the arrest of Matias Santana, a member of the Lafken Winkul Mapu, on February 17; the extradition of Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche (RAM) leader Facundo Jones Huala on January 4; and the arrest of RAM’s second-in-command Gonzalo Fabian Cona on January 14. However, given that the identities of most perpetrators of such attacks remain unconfirmed and the frequent lack of closure in investigations, it highlights the inadequacies of the existing security situation. This coupled with the existing heightened sentiments over the detention of Mapuche political prisoners, Pichun’s arrest is likely to prompt protests in the near term, as evidenced by January 3 protests by CAM members outside El Manzano prison in Concepcion where several Mapuche community members are being held. Moreover, Pichun’s arrest is also likely to prompt intimidatory attacks against police personnel and establishments over the coming days in the form of arson attacks or shootings in response. 

• As of April 16, Estado Mayor Central-Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia’s (EMC-FARC) leader Ivan Mordisco withdrew from the peace negotiations with the government amid intra-group divisions.  
• On April 11-13, alleged EMC-FARC led attacks in Cauca included a car bomb in Miranda, a shootout in Corinto, and an explosive attack in Santander de Quilichao. This comes after EMC-FARC-led attacks on April 4-5.  

Assessments & Forecast: The development highlights the decentralized nature of EMC-FARC, with substructures operating with varying degrees of autonomy, resulting in heightened intra-EMC-FARC tension, especially in the face of peace dialogues. Considering this, Mordisco’s absence from the peace talks underscores the fragile nature of the negotiations and further suggests a deepening internal rift within EMC-FARC, potentially weakening their unified stance. This is particularly notable considering that talks with other EMC-FARC commanders will continue. The government’s decision to negotiate with other EMC-FARC commanders points to a possible strategy of isolating more radical elements within the group. Going forward, negotiations are likely to be protracted, given that military operations and subsequent retaliatory attacks, are expected to continue in the near-to-medium term, both in Cauca, Narino, and Valle del Cauca which are the group’s strongholds. To a lesser extent, the threat of associated violence will persist in Guaviare, where EMC-FARC’s Bloque Amazonas has warned civilians against cooperating with military forces, and in Huila, Tolima, and Quindio, where April 1 reports indicate the emergence of EMC-FARC’s new substructure, “Comandante Isaias Pardo Central,” which declared intention to act in solidarity with factions operating in western stronghold regions.  

Current Situation: 

• On April 13, armed bandits hijacked a cargo vessel carrying around 1,500 bags of rice and held the boat’s six occupants captive, near Arcahaie commune, bound for Gonave, in the Ouest Department. 
• Separately, the ongoing State of Emergency was extended until May 3 and the curfew from 19:00-06:00 (local time) in Ouest Department, including in Port-au-Prince (PauP), until April 17. 

Assessments & Forecast: The hijacking underscores the credible threat posed to cargo vessels by maritime piracy along PauP’s coastline, evidenced by security officials reclaiming a freighter carrying rice off the PauP coast on April 7, which had been earlier hijacked by 5 Secondes and Les Talibans gangs in PauP’s Port de Varreux, on April 4. While sporadic reports of boat piracy and associated kidnappings in Haiti have been noted since August 2023, the recent surge, particularly targeting private cargo ships transporting essential goods, can be attributed to the scarcity of these items resulting from ongoing gang violence. Considering Haiti’s reliance on imports of rice, millet, corn from the USA, and wheat from Canada, amid acute food insecurity, there is a heightened risk of similar gang-perpetrated hijackings near key ports such as Port international de Port-au-Prince (HTPAP), Port des Gonaives, and the Varreux terminal in PauP, in the coming weeks. Concurrently, mainland Haiti faces recurrent violent attacks aimed at thwarting the establishment of the CARICOM-led Transitional Presidential Council (TPC). These attacks, which include looting and gang-led shootings in residential areas and near government buildings, are likely to persist in PauP. 

Current Situation:  

• On April 13-14, assailants set ablaze four public transport units in Acapulco, leading to the suspension of public transportation services. 
• On April 13, in the Cumbres de Figueroa neighborhood, in Chilpancingo, suspects fired shots and set afire a taxi, killing the driver inside. 

Assessments & Forecast: The modus operandi and extortion-related attacks in Chilpancingo and Acapulco, including shootings and arson targeting public transportation, notably on March 27, February 20, 21, and 25 in Acapulco, suggest a plausible connection of the April incidents with extortion threats. This underscores the persistent threat of extortion-induced violence against public transport, evidenced by an April 11 arson attack on two vans in Chilpancingo. Consequently, the cessation of bus and taxi services remains likely in the near term amid the potential for escalated threats, witnessed by a nine-day suspension of 90 percent of transportation modalities on February 5, after six drivers were murdered in Chilpancingo. Short-to-medium distance public transport routes connecting towns near Acapulco and Chilpancingo will likely be affected. The situation highlights the inefficacy of existing security measures, including the Transporte Seguro operation maintained in Acapulco since January 15. The security situation will likely hinder Acapulco’s efforts to revitalize its tourism sector, still grappling with the aftermath of Hurricane Otis in October 2023. With President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador guaranteeing security following April 13-14 incidents ahead of Convencion Bancaria (National Banking Convention) in Acapulco on April 18-19, increased police presence remains likely on main thoroughfares and public spaces, including Avenida Costera Miguel Aleman and Boulevard de las Naciones.

Current Situation: 

• On April 15, a US State Department spokesperson announced that Washington, DC will not renew the temporary license that eased sanctions on Venezuela’s oil and gas sector, set to expire on April 18.  
• The decision was attributed to the alleged lack of progress by President Nicolas Maduro-led government in implementing provisions of the October 2023 agreement signed with the opposition parties.  

Assessments & Forecast: The decision was anticipated following January 29 reports that Washington would not renew the license beyond April 18 without “political progress”. This comes amid sustained crackdown on opposition figures, including multiple arrests since January for alleged assassination plots against Maduro, and refusal to allow Corina Yoris, a replacement for Vente Venezuela’s Maria Machado, to register for the June 28 presidential election. Reimposed sanctions will impact state-run Petroleos de Venezuela SA’s operations, which saw a 7.5 percent increase in exports to 671,140 bpd in February, heightening domestic concerns about declining oil output and hyperinflation. These could potentially fuel anti-government sentiment, although a significant impact to Maduro’s electoral prospects remains unlikely, given the absence of strong opposition. Regardless, authorizations already granted to US and European companies to trade in Venezuelan crude will likely remain, aiming to ensure a stable supply of crude and maintain global oil prices, amid ongoing instability in the Middle East. Overall, tensions over Venezuela’s adherence to fair elections, reemergence of Venezuela-Guyana territorial disputes, and heightened public sentiments in the USA over immigration, including Venezuela-originated, ahead of the November 2024 US polls will limit scope of Caracas-Washington rapprochement.