Current Situation:  

• On March 14, the Senate voted 42-25, to reject the Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia (DNU), President Javier Milei’s executive decree, a wide range of reforms aimed at deregulating and privatizing the economy. 
• The DNU remains in effect pending a vote in the Chamber of Deputies. 

Assessments & Forecast: Following the court’s ruling that declared DNU’s labor chapter as unconstitutional on January 30, the recent vote jeopardizes the DNU’s remaining provisions. With Martin Lousteau, Union Civica Radical’s (UCR) leader, voting against the DNU due its alleged unconstitutionality, inter-party tensions between Milei’s La Libertad Avanza (LLA) party and UCR are likely to remain, plausibly derailing LLA’s efforts to garner support ahead of the lower house vote. Therefore, with LLA’s deputies comprising only 15 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and given the lack of support from centrist parties including UCR, the DNU’s repeal remains plausible. Milei’s March 14 reference to the senate rejection as an attack on the ‘Pacto de Mayo’, a proposal to agree on ten policy priorities with provincial governors, is likely to jeopardize the pact’s signing on May 25. With the rejection of the omnibus bill on February 6 preceding the DNU’s vote, the developments represent a major setback for Milei’s libertarian economic reforms. Regardless, multi-sectoral strikes and demonstrations by labor unions and left-wing groups against the government’s public sector layoffs and spending cuts, such as the nationwide demonstrations on March 18, are expected to recur in the coming weeks, resulting in service disruptions and occasionally escalating into localized unrest. 

Current Situation: 

• On March 17, the national government announced the suspension of the ongoing bilateral ceasefire agreement, effective until July 15, with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) dissidents, in the departments of Cauca, Narino, and Valle del Cauca.  
• The national government also declared the resumption of security operations against EMC-FARC in the aforementioned departments starting at 00:00 (local time) on March 20.  
• This follows an attack by members of the EMC-FARC linked Dagoberto Ramos substructure on an indigenous community, killing one and injuring two others in Toribio, Cauca on March 16. 

Assessments & Forecast: The developments highlight a significant setback in the ongoing Paz Total peace negotiations, especially since the fourth cycle of negotiations concluded on March 10. Considering the stronghold of Dagoberto Ramos, Franco Benavidez, and Carlos Patino substructures across the said regions, the incidents also reiterate the decentralized structure and operational capabilities of EMC-FARC dissidents’ factions. This is further evidenced by Franco Benavidez faction using civilians to perpetrate attack against the army, as witnessed in Cumbitara, Narino on March 3, likely to circumvent the ceasefire. The resumption of military operations is likely to lead to increased armed confrontations in the form of clashes, and ambushes, between the army and EMC-FARC forces in the near term, thereby elevating the security risk across Cauca, Narino, and Valle del Cauca. Subsequently, there is a high risk of forced displacement, confinement of residents, and armed threats, including extortion and kidnappings targeting residents and local businesses in the aforementioned regions. 

Current Situation: 

• Authorities have extended the ongoing curfew in Ouest Department, including in Port-au-Prince (PauP) from 19:00-05:00 (local time) until March 20, while the ongoing State of Emergency (SoE) will remain in place until April 3. 
• Per March 19 reports, the names of all seven members of the CARICOM-proposed Transitional Council were sent to PM Ariel Henry, with their appointment reportedly slated for March 22. 

Assessments & Forecast: The curfew extension highlights the persisting precarious security landscape in Haiti, especially in PauP. Given the persisting attacks in retaliation to the Transistional Council, coupled with threatening messages by G-9 leader Jimmy Cherizier against officials on March 15, violence will likely ensue. Critical infrastructure including police stations, government buildings, oil terminals, power plants, and hospitals are likely to remain the primary targets, as seen in multiple attacks against police stations on March 15 and arson attacks at four substations in PauP’s Varreux power plant on March 18. There has also been an expansion of indiscriminate shooting attacks and lootings at residences and banks, as seen in PauP’s Belleville area on March 17, with several upscale areas also now impacted. This is supported by March 18 reports on armed bandits looting homes in Laboule, Petion-Ville, and Thomassin. Although arrests will be recorded sporadically throughout PauP, a significant improvement in the security landscape is unlikely. This is especially as several opposition parties like Platfom Pitit Desalin and Ansanm have rejected CARICOM’s proposal, with the security situation likely to be exacerbated by potential anti-government protests in the coming days. 

Current Situation: 

• Per March 17 reports, the US Border Patrol (BP) captured a Lebanese national attempting to enter the USA, along the US-Mexico border near El Paso, TX on March 8. 
• The suspect, identified as Basel Bassel Ebbadi, claimed to be a member of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah group for the last seven years and, aimed to create and detonate an explosive device in New York City, NY. 

Assessments & Forecast: The arrest highlights the rising threat of terrorist elements attempting to enter the USA illegally amid the persisting border crisis, with 59 individuals arrested by BP under the ‘Terrorist Screening Database’ between January and March 2024. Further, it reiterates the threat posed by the growing presence of Iranian-backed elements in Latin America to carry out attacks against individuals or institutions deemed as being supportive of Israel and/or its Western backers amid the Israel-Hamas war and the Israel-Hezbollah clashes. This is supported by the arrest of two Hezbollah affiliates in Sao Paulo, Brazil on November 8, 2023, and the arrest of a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force in Lima, Peru on March 7. Although the arrest thwarted a potential attack and the details regarding Ebbadi’s plan remain unclear, the development nevertheless denotes a credible risk of attacks from lone-wolf actors, motivated by ideology and training under Hezbollah. Overall, the detention reiterates the potential for individuals who are part of Iran-backed groups and/or are motivated by the ideology of the Iran-backed “Axis of Resistance” to attempt to target the West directly. 

Current Situation: 

• On March 14, the US House of Representatives passed a bill forcing a Chinese parent company to sell its video-sharing application within the next six months to a buyer that “satisfies” the US government or to face a full ban.  
• On March 12, Congressmen introduced the Responsible Use of Seafloor Resources Act bill, calling for federal resources for seafloor nodule collection, processing, and refining, to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities and bolster manufacturing and jobs. This would also combat over-reliance on China for the production of critical minerals.  

Assessments & Forecast: The March 12 bill is reflective of continued efforts to counter Chinese influence across multiple sectors, with China particularly controlling 60 percent of global production and 85 percent of refining capacity in the critical minerals sector. The March 14 bill specifically highlights attempts to crack down on Chinese applications deemed as a “national security” threat amid concerns of data sharing, with authorities arresting a Chinese national for stealing AI secrets from a US company on March 7. Further, the March 14 bill is likely strategically aligned with attempts to protect electoral credibility ahead of the November 5 presidential elections, supported by US officials claiming that misinformation about US political candidates in the 2022 midterm elections was spread by pro-China accounts through the same Chinese application. Therefore, legislative efforts reinforcing US interests in containing Chinese growth and influence, amid the ongoing strategic rivalry between the two, will persist, straining bilateral relations despite diplomatic meetings between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in November 2023. 

Current Situation:  

• Per March 14 reports, Whillfer Jose Pina Azuaje, member of the opposition La Causa Radical party, and Renzo Estibenz Flores, former national guard officer, were arrested in Maturin, Monagas on March 11, for allegedly planning to assassinate President Nicolas Maduro.  
• Azuaje and Flores reportedly planned to recruit 50 soldiers to steal weapons and a vehicle to carry out a “coup d’etat.” 
• On March 16, the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) party declared Maduro as its candidate for the July 28 presidential elections.  

Assessments & Forecast: Although the arrests denote an elevated threat against Maduro, they may be perceived as politically motivated, in line with the government’s crackdown on political opposition discerned as “anti-establishment”. This is especially plausible as this follows the arrests of Emill Brandt Ulloa, campaign manager for opposition presidential candidate Maria Corina Machado on March 9; human rights activist Rocio San Miguel on February 9, and over 36 individuals arrested in January, all for planning conspiracy plots against Maduro. Considering the approaching March 25 deadline to register candidates for the July presidential elections, arbitrary detentions of political opponents are expected to increase. This is further evidenced by Maduro annulling 14 political parties, including five opposition parties on March 17 to restrict opposition nominations and arresting a fifth activist from Machado’s party on March 19. These developments are likely to exacerbate political and diplomatic tensions with the USA in the run-up to the July elections, with Washington likely to pause sanctions relief on Caracas, slated to expire on April 18.