Iranian Attack 

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson stated that during the overnight hours of April 13-14, Iran launched around 330 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles toward Israel. The IDF Spokesperson indicated that 99 percent of these aerial targets were successfully downed.  
• The Iranian attack included around 185 UAVs and 30 cruise missiles, none of which penetrated Israel’s airspace, as per the IDF spokesperson.  
• Over 120 ballistic missiles were also launched. Most missiles were intercepted by Israel’s “Arrow” system and in cooperation with strategic partners before entering Israeli airspace. A limited number impacted Israel, and minor damage was recorded in an IDF base in southern Israel. A seven-year-old Bedouin resident of southern Israel was severely wounded by falling fragments.  
• Reports citing Israeli officials indicate that US, UK, French, and Jordanian forces were involved in intercepting Iranian aerial targets during the attack. 

Statements 

• On April 14, Iran’s Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, reportedly stated that Iran’s operation against Israel has concluded and threatened that if Israel retaliates, Tehran’s response would be more significant than Tehran’s April 13 attack.  
• US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, stated that US forces downed dozens of missiles and UAVs launched from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. He stated that the US does not want a conflict with Iran but will not hesitate to defend its forces and support Israel. 
• US President Joe Biden reportedly stated the US helped Israel down nearly all of the drones and missiles launched by Iran. He further stated he would convene the G7 leaders in order to coordinate a diplomatic reaction to Iran’s assault.  
• An April 13-14 overnight meeting of the Israeli war cabinet concluded and authorized PM Benjamin Netanyahu, and ministers Yoav Galant and Benny Gantz, to decide on an Israeli response to Iran’s assault.  
• Several states, including France, Japan, and the UK, have condemned Iran for its attack. 
• The UN Security Council (UNSC) will convene on April 14 to discuss the latest developments. 
• Reports citing White House officials indicate that President Biden expressed opposition to an Israeli retaliatory action in Iran and stated that the US would not participate in such a retaliation. 
• A Jordanian cabinet statement confirmed that Jordan intercepted aerial targets that penetrated its airspace to protect Jordan’s citizens. 

Travel 

• The Israeli airspace was reportedly reopened during the morning hours of April 14. Ben Gurion International Airport has resumed operations, although changes to flight schedules will be implemented and delays are expected. 
• The Jordanian, Iraqi, and Lebanese airspaces were also reportedly reopened as of the morning hours of April 14. 
• Israel’s Home Front Command lifted the order on remaining close to bomb shelters/safe rooms.

1. Iran’s combined UAV, cruise, and ballistic missile attack against Israel constitutes an unprecedented event with strategic implications. For decades, Iran has attempted to weaken Israeli security and challenge both the US and Israel militarily through the proxy network that it has established, funded, and armed in the Middle East. Despite saber-rattling and aggressive rhetoric, Iran has generally opted to push confrontations with its adversaries away from its borders through either its proxies or by focusing on the cyber or maritime domains. The attack by Tehran on Israeli territory from Iranian soil demonstrates an attempt by the Islamic Republic to change the balance of power in the region and the equation/dynamics between the parties.  
2. Given that the attack came in response to the alleged Israeli strike on an Iranian diplomatic installation in Damascus that killed a senior IRGC commander on April 1, it points to an effort to deter Israel from targeting Iranian positions and interests throughout the region and in Iran itself, as Israel has for many years with relative impunity. In this way, the incident marks a transition from a more covert shadow war into a more open and potentially dangerous era of open hostilities between the parties. That said, Iran’s actions point to a continued fear of a broader escalation. This can be seen through its warnings and messages via intermediaries regarding the nature of its attack prior to the incident, removing the element of surprise. In addition, Iran’s decision to first deploy slower drones that take time to reach Israeli airspace and time them with the firing of much faster ballistic missiles that take around 12 minutes to reach Israeli territory when Israel was already on high alert, reinforces this assessment.  
3. Israel’s ability (and that of its regional partners) to intercept 99 percent of the 330 missiles and UAVs fired at the country, at least per the IDF spokesperson, highlights a strategic achievement and show of capabilities by the Israeli security apparatus. Israel’s ability in the initial period, likely together with the US, to detect the launching of the munitions from Iran allowed time to instruct residents of Israel to prepare themselves and shelter in place. The subsequent failure of all Iranian UAVs and cruise missiles, which have proven extremely effective military tools in multiple other arenas throughout the region and in other global conflicts, highlights Israel’s superior air defense array vis-a-vis Iran’s offensive capabilities. This is reflected in an effective multilayered approach by Israel, employing the long-range Arrow system to intercept the vast majority of the ballistic missiles, and the use of the Israel Air Force (IAF) aircraft and other aerial defense systems to intercept many of the UAVs and cruise missiles. 
4. Although Israel’s air defenses were effective, the event also demonstrated the country’s dependence on the US and its partners for its defense. The US’s military presence in the wider Middle East and deployment of advanced air defense systems was crucial in intercepting many of the projectiles over Iraqi, Jordanian, and Syrian airspace prior to their attempted penetration of Israeli airspace. This extra layer of protection likely also enabled Israeli defenses to intercept the remaining projectiles and minimize the risk of the systems being overwhelmed. Of particular note was the role of Jordan and its willingness to essentially aid by intercepting some of the threats in Jordanian airspace. This is despite its diplomatic hostility toward Israel in recent months over the IDF’s operation in the Gaza Strip and highlights a shared security interest against the Iranian threat.  
5. More broadly, the event was strategically important for Israel’s global interests. After months of international opinion turning against Jerusalem amid its campaign in the Gaza Strip, the condemnation of Iran and support for Israel demonstrated both diplomatically and kinetically by several of its key partners, especially the US and UK, highlights their commitment to Israel’s security.  
6. FORECAST: Israel is overall likely to retaliate against the Iranian attack in order to restore its deterrence and the existing equation between the parties. Given the reported opposition of US President Biden and Netanyahu’s proclivity to drag out such strategic decisions when under pressure from multiple sides, Israel’s war cabinet is likely to take some time to carefully calibrate its decision. The likely Israeli retaliation may therefore take several days to materialize. Israel also has to consider multiple other considerations, including its focus on the Gaza Strip, a potential response from Hezbollah and an escalation on the northern border, and its strategic relationship with the US. The desire to placate the US and gain concessions for Israel’s activities in other arenas may play a factor in reducing the scale of the response.  
7. FORECAST: It is more likely that Israel will attempt a retaliatory attack on Iranian soil, as it has pledged to do and has had time to gather intelligence on potential targets, without forcing Iran into a potentially more escalatory response. It will therefore retaliate in accordance with the outcome of Iran’s largely intercepted missile/drone assault, rather than the intention of the attack. An attempt to project reciprocity for an attack on Israeli soil will likely take precedence over a strike on an Iranian proxy in the region. However, any Israeli retaliation increases the risk of an escalation and a miscalculation by one of the parties, which Jerusalem seeks to avoid. That said, Israel and Iran both have an interest in containing this incident and neither side seeks all-out war, including between Israel and Hezbollah. 

Those operating or residing in the MENA region are advised to continue business operations while ensuring they remain abreast of regional updates and prepare for emergency scenarios.